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PART I
LUCRErIUS' PROBLEM:
CHAPTER I

THE ETHICO-THEOLOGICAL PURPOSE OF LUCRETIUS
Maoaulay has dispatched Epioureanism with the label, "silliest of philosophies."

The critioism is patently devastating, and

it true, would reflect rather unfavorably on the author whose work
is the subjeot of this thesis.

Undoubtedly, it Epioureanism is

studied in the popular, but perverted, torms it took in the hands
of some ot its later proponents, it will appear "silly".

But no

just oriticism oan be leveled at a partioular philosophy unless it
is studied in its pure torm and in the oontext ot sooial, religious, and even politioal lite that gave rise to it.

It is the

purpose ot this paper to make suoh a study.
The Epicureanism of Luoretius will be thrown against the
baokground in whioh it was set, analyzed in its purity, and then
evaluated in the light of subsequent philosophioal progress.

This

treatment should leave us with a just estimate of Luoretius' attempt to answer the religious and moral problem ot his day.
Though it will oertainly not win our

approv~l

ot his philosophy,

it will at least give us an understanding ot his objective and
method of reasoning, and will allow us to sympathize with the
1
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author who, limited as he was by his contact with a decadent pagan
philosophy, thought he saw in his system a solution for the religiouS evils that were crushing the Roman people of his day.
Lucretian psychology will not be discussed in this paper.
The poet's epistemological theory will be examined only with relation to his theological thought, ot which it is a fundamental
premise and integral part.

Our primary and direct concern will be

the ethico-theological structure which Lucretius erected as a bulwark against superstition.

More specifically, we shall try to

present, first, a clear notion of Lucretius' purpose or objective,
the removal of superstition; secondly, an examination of the problem of superstition which occasioned such an objective; and
thirdly, in the light of his problem and objective, an analysis
and evaluation of the three steps in the solution he proposed.
This solution, we shall find, begins with an acknowledgment ot
the gods' existence; proceeds to a denial of divine participation
in the atfairs of men; and finally culminates in the rejection ot
a divine sanction for the deeds of man.

This rejection, growing

logically, Lucretius felt, from the previous steps, would effectively destroy the foundation of superstition which could not
exist when fear of punishment at the hands of the gods had been
eliminated.
Early in the first book of the De Rerum Natura, after describing the rear of eternal punishment that crushes the spirit of

;u __-----------------------------------------------------.. -~.:::-.--. ~~~~~-.3
man, Lucretius tells us his purpose in writing:

"~igitur

ter-

rorem an1mi tenebrasgue necessest ••• discutiant ••• naturae species

1

ratiogue".

Release from the fear of the gods, he believes, will

be found in knowledge of nature.

Later he will find joy in the

thought that it is his privilege to set the mind free from the
"nodis religionum".

2

We can be sure that the bonds he intends to

break are bonds woven out of fear of the gods.
Such an objective could appear thoroughly iconoclastic to
the reader who neglected to view Lucretius

~n

the light of his

times, and who consequently was not aware of the object of his
attack.

Whether in praise or blame, he might be tempted to

charge, without qUalification, that Lucretius was anti-religious,
since the poet aimed to abolish the reverence for divinity which
is proper to true religion.
Yet, the fear that Lucretius opposed was not rational, filial
respect for divinity, but rather the superstitious fear that grew
out of a decayed, formalized religion which, even in its period
of vigor, never included a worthy concept of deity.

The word

"religion, we must remember, obviously did not have the same
meaning for Lucretius as it does for us: the binding of man to
the one, unchanging, all-perfect Father Who treats His creature
with love and justice.
1
I

For Lucretius, as for all Romans, the

T. Lucretius Carus, De Rerum Natura, trans1. by W.H.D. Rouse,
Heinemann, London; Putnam's Sons, New York, 1924, I, 146.
2 Ibid., IV, 7.

U@
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word signified the relations of men with a group of 'super-men',
with gods who were not above capricious anger and revenge for some
minute and indeliberate offense committed against them.

Naturally

relations with such beings were oharacterized from the beginning
by uncertainty, fear, and, espeoially in Luoretius' time, by
superstitious practices designed to placate temperamental gods.
We see, then, that Lucretius' attitude was one of rebellion,
not against Divinity as such, but as conceived in his time.
Whether he would have opposed the Christian concept of reverence
for God we simply cannot say, though certainly he could not have
based his opposition on the same grounds.

We can be sure, however,

that superstitious fear, in its causes and manifestations, was
the evil that accounts for his almost

~auline

zeal.

It is ac-

countable, too, for many of the weaknesses in his system of ethics
and of physics.

So overpowering was his conviction that super-

stition with its excesses contradicted the nature of man, that he
seemed willing to put up with less manifest inconsistencies if
only he could rid the world of it.

-

He could not see what evils

might be generated by the inconsistencies.

He could see, and see

with a poet's sensitiveness to human misery that left him in anguish, the canker disfiguring and tormenting his people.

Poten-

tial evil that was uncertain must have appeared slight beside the
evil that disrupted Roman religious and social life before his
eyes.

Like Epicurus before him, he had reason for the philosophy

he proposed.

"If 'weakness' comes into the reckoning at all, we

JII...----------------~=---. -------------_=__=_=~====::=should bear in mind the unhealthiness, not of an individual, but
of Greece under tyrants, and of Rome in the late Republio."

3

Some wonder has been expressed that Epicureanism should find
its greatest popularity in two periods so unlike as those of Epiourus and Lucretius.

One would expect, it seems, that a system

adapted to the spirit, or better, to the want of spirit of early
third century Athens, stripped of the freedom and power that had
been her glory, could hardly suit the temperament of Rome, torn
with the pangs of transition and "big with the potentialities of
Empire".

Yet, is there not a striking resemblance beneath surface

appearances?

Granted the almost oontradiotory political status of

the two oities, one free and the other in bondage, was there not a
similar SRiritual destitution, olosely conneoted with politioal
conditions but dependent upon other factors as well, which makes
the rise of Epioureanism in Rome quite reasonable?

In both cities

individual responsibility and duty were being saorifioed before
power politics, in one ease domestic, foreign in the other, with a
consequent loss of the sense of personal dignity.

In both oities

there was a growing vagueness about God that bore fruit in superstition.

Little wonder, then, that two voices should be raised,

different in many respeots, but alike in these two at least, that
they stressed the dignity of the individual, and

pro~essed

the

power to finish the dragon of superstition with one stroke.
3 E. E. Sikes, Lucretius,
Cambridge, 1936, 64.

~

and Phi.losoRher, University Press,

· ::USd g
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How did Luoretius hope to banish this superstitious terror ot
the gods which he telt to be the ourse ot Rome?

Fundamentally,

the answer was to be tound in knowledge ot nature.

The recognition

ot natural laws WaS to tree man trom the anxiety consequent upon
beliet in capricious, tyrranical gods.

His was a perteot oonti-

dence, a contidenoe at times annoyingly presumptuous, that he
could educate all men to live a lite ot tranquility worthy ot the
gods themselves.

~o

matter what might be the individual ditter-

ences ot men, there was no one whose fear would not dissolve betore the power of reason.

4

An optimistio outlook, indeed, and a

message ot hope tor the contused, despairing multitude.
To realize this hope Lucretius employed the physical theory
originated by Demooritus and slightly evolved by Epicurus.

Atom-

ism was not elaborated tor its own sake, but was entirely directed
5

to the moral end which Lucretius had set himselt.

This view

seems tar more in keeping with the tenor of the Whole poem and
with the occasional digreSSions trom pure physics tor ethioal applications, than the opinion that Lucretius did not make such a
distribution of emphasis between physics and ethics.

6

Certainly

the poet was tar more appreCiative than Epicurus of the wonder
and beauty ot nature, but this appreciation pales beside the
4
5

Q. g. H., III, 322.

In support ot this opinion are W.Y. Sellar, in ~ Roman Poets
ot ~ Republic, 3rd edit., Oxford University Press, London,
1932, 310; and C. Bailey, "Religion and Philosophy", The Legacy
2!~, ed. by C. Bailey, Clarendon Press, Oxtord, 1923, 251.
6 This second opinion seems to be held by Sikes, 92.

j2~--------------------------------------~~--~~~~~~~
7
passion he displays in using nature as a foil for superstition.
We are naturally led to ask how reason, exercised through a
knowledge 01' physical laws, is to liberate man from fear and its
consequent evils.

Lucretius argued that just as the atom is free

by a law of nature from the capricious interference of the gods
("quid quaeque

~ueant

per 1'oedera naturai quid porro nequeant,

sancitum guandoguidem extat"),

7

same law and the same freedom.

so, too, man participates in the
It the component parts 01' ,man, the

atoms, are beyond the control of the gods, 11' they combine and
disintegrate without divine inter1'erenoe, then man has nothing to
fear in this 11fe or beyond it.

He simply comes into being as an

individual by the collision of tiny particles, and he ceases to
exist and to feel as an individual when the particles disperse.
Consequently, just as orime proceeds from a dread of death's
punishments which drives man to selfish greed for all that life
8

can otfer him licitly or illicitly,

so a release from that dread

and its sinful effects will be found in the knowledge that man is
entirely mortal and that the gods must be indifferent toward his
actions.

Ultimate liberation will follow upon the realization

that the gods have no power over this world 01' ours and its
9

inhabitants.

7 D. g. N., I, 5861'.
8 Ibid., III, 40-90.
9 For Luoretius' reasoning here, conter G.D. Hadzits, Lucretius
~ His Influence, Longmans, Green & Co., N.Y., 1935, 127-132.

------. - .-. .--- -_.- ._--;--......-..- -.....i42.,••
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Lucretius struok courageously at the paramount evil of his
time, the inadequacy of anthropomorphio gods.

It is regrettable

that in doing so he passed to the opposite extreme and destroyed
the foundation of true relationship with God and, consequently,
of a vigorous oode of morality.

lie simply did not have a positive

remedy to funotion in the place ot the evil he depreoated.
We can be sure that just as sincere and earnest as his hatred
of cant and religious formalism was his hatred of sin.

This is
10
manifest trom his criticism ot greed for power and riches,
ot
11
dishonesty and infidelity,
of lust, pride, selfishness, brutal12
ity, debauchery and sloth.
Yet, this hatred ot sin was a negative affair, oharacteristio of the whole moral outlook of Lucretius.

He knew what to destroy but was scarcely the one to lay

foundations for the rebuilding.

Consequently, his contribution

is, as Fowler has pointed out, only "indirectly a religious
one, ••• a wholesome contempt for superstition and all the baser
13
side of religious belief and practice."
Consequently, too, it
is easy to see how Epicureanism, more than any other anoient system of

promin~noe,

could easily carry the less wary or less vir-

tuous disciple to the opposite extreme, to an apathetic, laissez
faire attitude toward the gods and religious responsibility.

10
11
12
13

D. B. li., II, 13.
Ibid., III, 83.
Ibid., V, 43ff.
Fowler, !h! Religious Experience of the Roman People,
Macmillan, London, 1922, 361.

w:w:

Jid

-

We see, then, the oontradiction in Luoreti-qst objective, the
oontradiotion which escaped him as it has esoaped many others who,
oonsciously or unoonsciously, have followed him down to our own
day, because they, too, have had no true concept of God.

The poet

desired a moral code that would eliminate the vice and orime ot
hiS time.

Yet, because he was disillusioned with the Roman gods,

because he felt that superstitious tear of the gods was the source
of all evil, he rejected entirely divine sanotion, failing to see
that without it there can be no effeotive code of morality.

This

basio weakness in Luoretius' system will be examined in the last
ohapter of this thesis.
In Lucretius' rebellion against the gods of the pagans, we
reach the summit of the Epicurean philosophy of Individualism.
Man, the Pget felt, had been bound by the "knots of religion", had
lost his dignity in debasement before false gods.

Now he was to

seek his end ot moderated pleasure, free from the irrational fear
that had enslaved him.
Cicero, in the second book of the

~

Finibus, long ago pointed

out the rooks that lurked beneath the surfaoe of such a philosophy.
The problem that drove Lucretius into such treacherous waters must
have been a great one, and is well worthy of

~ore

ation before we consider the solution he proposed.

detailed examin-

QUE!

CHAPTER II
SUPERSTITION IN ROAm
superstition has been well defined as

a~elief

founded on

irrational feelings, especially of fear, and marked by credulity;
1

also any rite or practice inspired by such fear".

In Lucretius'
2

eyes this was the blight that brought all evil into the world,
3
all unhappiness and discontent.
Because of it man can not find
satisfaction or rest in any pleasure. Neither rich nor poor, pow4
erful nor weak are spared.
All alike who are ignorant of Ule
causes of things lie in its shadow and consequently look upon the
5
How sad the picworld and the gods darkly as through a glass.
ture of the restless, bored ftplayboy" who has all this world 'can
6
offer except peace of mind.
His flight trom mansion to villa is
really but a flight from the self he has grown to hate, and trom
the vague cause of his disquiet, uncertainty about the future and
the punishments it may bring.

Lucretius found the mind of man be-

fouled with superstition, and until it was purged the poet felt
that man could bring forth fruits neither of happiness nor of
1 College Stand. Dict., Funk, Wagnalls, New York, 1922, 1130.
2 D. R. N., II, l;;-III, 40, 65.
3 ibid.,-III, 1055.
4 !DIa., II, 20-40.
5 Ibid., I, l5lff.
6 IbId., III, 105'3ff.
10

11

7

Here was the problem as Lucretius saw it, and he set himself
to his task with a will.

We shall best appreciate his efforts by

first studying the problem in its causes and manifestations.
These causes were two-fold: one indirect, consisting of the
social and political elements of unrest in Rome at the time; the
second direct, consisting of the fundamental inadequacy of the
Roman religion.
If there ever was a time when political and social trends
influenced the spiritual state of a nation, it was in Rome of the
first century B.C., particularly in the turbulent days of Lucretius' lifetime, trom 99 to 55 B.C.
impression on him is unquestionable.

That they produced a profound
He could well take joy in

the thought that his philosophy enabled him to stand otf from the
stormy sea around him and gaze in tranquility upon
trigues of his country-men.

a

th~

endless in-

The Roman of this era passed through

decades of bloodshed, vengeance, mistrust and uncertainty that almost destroyed his confidence in mankind.

Little wonder that he

should cast his eyes aloft for courage and hope with unprecedented
fervor; little wonder that he should be afflicted with a sense of
sin and of the gods' displeasure that drove him frantically to the
altar to propitiate them.

7

a

~. R.
~.,

When the orthodox religion had become

li., III, 40; V, 45ff.
III, 7ff.

12

and uninspiring, incapable of giving release from the
lens e of desertion that oppressed the Roman people, it was natural
tQ expect that they would turn elsewhere for relief: to new cults
and eventually to superstition.

How significant were these political trends?
they present a rare soene of sooial chaos.
.

When acoumulated

Lucretius was a child

.

n Rome was forced at the expense of countless lives to defend
her prestige and hegemony against the Italian nations, olamoring
tor franchise in the Sooial Wars.

He was old enough to be

horri~

tied by the sight of 10,900 oorpses in the Forum, after the followers of the consul, Gnaeus Ootavius, butohered the supporters

ot his oolleague, Oinne.

This was merely one incident in the

Oivil War that reaohed its bitter end with Sulla's slaughter of
4,000 Samnite prisoners within the shadow of Rome's walls.

Per-

haps Lucretius lost close kinsmen in the fearful proscriptions
that testify to the treaohery and spirit of vengeanoe whioh charaoterized the diotatorships of Marius and Sulla.

The politioal

greed of publio oharaoters and the luxurious lives of private
citizens during the period leading up to the Oatilinarian oonspiracy in 63 B.O.were eloquent witnesses to the deoay of the old
Roman spirit.

It had been oharaoteristic of this spirit that the

citizen place the country he loved above all purely selfish gain.
Now the inefficienoy and dishonesty of government offioials could
engender only oontempt, or at least distrust, whioh led to the
ascendency of private over publiC interests.

13
The fact that Pompey, invested with extraordinary powers, ex-

terminated in three months the pirate hordes that had made the
seas, the Italian ooasts, and ,the very port of Rome their hunting
grounds, testifies indirectly to the inefficiency in high places.
previous to his appointment, little had been done to remedy a humiliating state of affairs.

Whole tribes had been forced to,mi-

grate inland, deserting their cities before they were ravaged.
With almost complete immunity the bucaneers had kidnapped prominent citizens and even the populations of entire islands, and had
held them for ransom.

Corn shipments had been cut off and Rome

threatened with consequent famine.

Fleets sent out to meet the

pirates had been vanquished and burnt.

No wonder the averageRo-

man felt his doubts growing and respect for his government dwindling when he saw this stain on his public conscience.
The selfishness and corruption of government officials spread
throughout Italy and inundated the farthest provinces and outposts.
Provincial governors generally bled their charges white, offering
them law and order but at the'price of economic enslavement.

It

is certain that Oicero was not using rhetorical exaggeration when
he described the hatred and grief kindled in the hearts of foreign
peoples by the "unbridled passions and the iniquities of govern9

mental administrators."

He vigorously portrays the effects of

the greed characteristic of the new epoch in Rome's history.
9 M. Oicero, De Imperio Cn. Pompei Oratio, ad. by A.B. Wilkins,
Macmillan, LOndon, 1914, xxiI, 65.

14

lugent omnes provinciae, queruntur omnes populi'
liberi, regna denique etiam omnia de nostris
cupiditatibus et injuriis expostulant; locus
intra Ooeanum iam nullus est neque tam longinquus neque tam reconditus, quo non per haec
tempora nostrorum hominum libido iniquitasque
pervaserit; sustinere iam populus Romanus omnium nationum non vim, non arma, non bellum,
sed luctus, lacrimas, querimonias non potest. 10
The shame for these injustices that cried to heaven could well

co~

tribute its share to the sense of sin whioh made all Rome uneasy.
In private life the same spiritual decay is manifest, probably
in no clearer instance than in the effects of slavery.

Aside from

the moral deterioration of the slaves themselves, the free members
of society suffered immensely by this human traffic.

The wealthy

were introduced to lives of excessive luxury, idleness and consequent vice; the poor found their services cheapened and often
undesired.

11

As a result we note a marked increase in the city

rabble, living honestly or dishonestly, but generally from hand to
mouth, selling their votes to the politician who offered the most
frequent panem

~

circenses, and passing their wretched lives in

the crowded insulae, breeding places of crime and vice.
The religious significance of these political and social
trends, culminating in the conflict of Ca.esar and Pompey, and in
the Catilinarean conspiraoy which capitalized on all the political

10
11

Cioero, la Q. Verrem Actio, Loeb Libr., Putnam, New York, 1928,
III,lxxx1X, 207.
T. Frank, An Economic Survey of Anoient Rome, dOhnS Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1933, I, 3837
----

abuse and popular discontent

o~

the preoeding decades, should be

evident to any student of history.

ot the orthodox Roman religion.

This period was the acid test

The question that tmmediately

comes to mind is whether or not that religion was vtgorous enough
to oope with the problem.

Other nations have faced similar spirit-

ual crises and their people have tound solace, hope and courage in
,

their beliets.

Ireland and Poland, to mention but two, have

passed through equal tests.

Whatever the political outcome may

bave been in such oases, one taot has always been clear.
the material carnage, national humiliation and

pro~ound

Through
human sor-

row has shone the steady light of a deepened faith that the pain
of this world has its reason and its oomfort in another.
Unfortunately this was not the case in ancient Rome, and here
we come to the seoond and direot cause

o~

the rise

the inadequacy of the Roman religion.

It simply was not able to

o~

superstition:

meet the crisis.
We must recall that the word 'religion' did not have exactly
the same meaning

~or

the Romans as it does

the latter the word primarily
as Supreme Lord

o~

signi~ies

~or

the Christian.

Yor

the acknowledgment of God

the Universe, and the expression of oonformity

ot our wills to His, our utter dependence upon and allegiance to
Him.

These taotors are more or less contained in the definition

ot religion quoted by FOWler: "the

e~fective

desire to be in right

£ i.i

t

16
relations with the Power manifesting itself in the universe".12

AS he points out,

howev~r,

the element,ot conformity to God's will

was absent from the Roman concept of religion.

All the Roman knew

about his gods was that they were powers for good or evil.

To be

in "right relations" with them meant the ability to placate them.
A pretentious body of rites, therefore, grew up around these
deities.

In fact, the Roman gods were deities of cult only.

Dogma was unheard of.

The only attitude with which the Roman ap-

proached his gods was one ot fear, a fear which their very obscurity accentuated.

It is easy to see how such ignorance would lead

to superstition.

When people do not know what to believe about

their gods, they are ready to believe anything.
norance of natural causes did the rest.

The Roman's ig-

The slightest rumbling

in the sky was a .anifestation of divine pleasure or disfavor.
No event, however insignificant, was without divine significance.
The people were literally hounded by the gods.

In an agrarian

society the weaknesses of such a religion would not be manifest,
but in the complex urban SOCiety that was Rome in the first century betore Ohrist, disturbed as it was by social and political
upheavals, it reduced the people to a state of near hysteria.
In such a degenerate condition Rome could not withstand the
current of Greek thought and philosophy that swept into it.
belief took hold ot the upper classes.

12 Fowler, 8.

un-

They were always careful

,

J

JUS$.

£

17
to confine their ridicule to private conversation.
private opinions might have

bee~they

eligion was the bulwark of the state.

Whatever their

did not air them in public.
So dependent was the state

upon it that a scrupulous tear of the gods was the only thing that
13
tept the Roman commonwealth together.
The patrician class used religion as a tool to exploit the
people.

Polybius, prompted by the experience of his own lifetime,

had been able to say that religion originated out of a desire of
14
politicians to attain their objectiVes.
It had been largely
by means ot 6lever appeal to religious feeling that the government
encouraged the people, already exhausted from the conflict with
Hannibal, to contribute their funds and their man-power for the
campaign against Macedon.

Convenient manipulation of auspices by

hired Etruscan seers, and speeches by consuls professing to reveal
the will of the gods in favor of the campaign, broke down the
resistance of a people who had grown accustomed to having their
15
religious fears and scruples allayed by public offiCials.
The
same successful process had been used to promote the less reasonable war with Antioohus of Syria.

16

With the development of this policy in religious affairs and

13

Po lyb ius , The Histories, transl. by W.P. Paton, Ue1a..an D,
London; Putnam's Sons, N.Y., VI, lvi, 7.
14 Ibid., VI, lvi" 9-12.
15 !::Livy, History of Rome, transl. by B.O. Foster, Heinemann,
London; Pu tnam f. Soni"';'N. Y., XXXI, 5, 7, 8.
16

.!..!.i!.,

XXXVI, 1.

lii

18
the proportionate loss of respect for old beliefs went an increasinglY pragmatic attitude toward religion In the minds of prominent
men. Eventually, in the age of Cicero, we find some of the most
outstanding men in publlc affairs estimatlng the worth of the jus
divinum by its utl1ity in maintaining public peace and patriotism.
Its entire value tor them seemed to be that ot a safeguard for the
constitution.

Sca.vola, himself a Pontifex Maximus, could speak

of three religions: the poet's, the philosopher's and the statesman's.

17

The last was the only one to be observed, regardless of

its objective truth and validity.

Clcero, a duly elected augur,

seems to have been of the same mind when he suggests' that augury
as a means of prophecy, though an illusion, was to be retained:
ttretinetur autem et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utllltates rei
publicae

1!!!".

18

~,

religio, disciplina, jus augurium, collegii auctor-

Undoubtedly the same utilitarian motive accounted tor

much of Augustus's zeal in the resuscitation of the orthodox,
indigenous Roman religion.
The decadence of Roman religlon reached its low-water mark in
the period ot Lucretius.

External disregard for what once had

been held sacred became manitest in many ways.

Temples were

neglected to such a degree that Augustus soon atter admits having

17 Augustine, Civitas Dei, transl. by J. Healy, E.P. Dutton,
18

N.Y., 1942,

IV, 27.---

Cicero, De Divinatione, transl. by W.A. Falconer, Heinemann,
London; Jitnam's Sons, N.Y., 1923, II, 33.

to

restore eighty two. 19

Sacrileges became more and more fre-

19

quent, as may be gathered from the thefts of temple statues and
sacred articles.

20

By Lucretius' time the priestly office, to a

great extent, was an organized hypocrisy, ready to use its sacred
tunctions, such as divination, for material and political advan21
es
tag •
Such is the picture of the religion that Was to sustain the
Roman people in the hour of their greatest need, when political
and social revolution shook their moral structure to its very
foundation.

Can we wonder that such a religious state drove them

to superstitious beliefs, in the hope that they would find some
solace for their souls?
Having seen superstition, then, in its causes, let us now
inquire briefly into its manifestations, thereby completing our
examination of the problem that motivated Lucretius' passionate
outburst.
The first sign, and perhaps the most significant, of the
trend toward superstition

w~s

the acceptance of Greek and espe-

cially of Oriental forms of religion with their emotional

19
20
21

Augustus, Monumentum Ancyranum, ed. by E.G. Hardy, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1923, IV, 17, la.
Cicero, De Natura Deorum, transl. by H. Rackham, Heinemann,
London; PUtnam's Sons, ~.Y., 1933, I, xxix, 82.
J~. Masson, Lucretius, Epicurean ~~, E.P. Dutton &. Co.,
N.Y., 1907, 31.
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eXpressions of expiation.

As far as the gen.ral public was con-

cerned, the advent of the foreigner meant contact'with new gods
and new religions.

If anything, it gave impetus to their super-

stitious practices.

The religions of Greece and the Orient were

even more degraded than that of the Romans.

The average Roman

began to shop around in these foreign cults tor gods who could
satisfy his wants when the old Italian deities failed.
enough he would tind them even more cooperative.

Frequently

The foreign gods

were much less lofty personages than the old Italian deities had
ever been, and the Roman would tind them just as ready to connive
at vice as they were to assist in more virtuous enterprises.
Their cults, too, were much more appealing, being little more than
drunken-and sexual orgies.
From the time of the Hannlbalic crisis on, instances of ofticial suppression of these cults became increasingly frequent.
Private interpretation of prodigia, when the people lost contidence in the ability of the state tQ win the benevolence of the
gods, reached such a point that quite early the authorities had to
issue an edict tor the confiscation of private forms of prophecy
22
and prayer, as well as rules of sacrifice.
Yet the government
realized that the religious fears of the people had to be allayed
for the public welfare, and so we find, first, the celebration of
23
festivals under the names of Greek gods,
then the official
22 Fowler, 325.
23 Livy, XXV, 12.

21

reoeption of the Magna Mater cult,24

and eventually, when the

tide was too strong to be ohecked, even connivance at the formerly
25
suppressed religions.
The old jus divinum was swallowed in
eastern mythology as the people sought an emotional catharsis for
their pent up religious fears and scruples.
It may well be that these foreign rites are aooountable in
part for Luoretius' strange oonoeption of superstition as the
source of all orime.

The Baoohanalia, which in time enrolled a

large number of Romans, inoluding muoh of the youth of noble
blood, certainly bred an unrestraint altogether at variance with
the old Roman character.

The drunkenness and excesses of these

orgiastio rites were indulged in the name of religious ecstasy,
the whole objeot of whioh was to attain communion with the divine
26
Charaoteristio of all these cults was an appeal to t~e
nature.
emotions rather than to the intellect and will, as the religiously
starved peo'ple sought in ceremonial purifications and symbolic
initiations true purity of heart which orthodoxy could not furnish.

It was only to be expected that as _the old morality broke

down, this laudable objective would find perverted expression in
the superstitious rites brought in through Etruria and Campania.
Another manifestation of increasing. superstition was the exaggerated att.ntion given to omens.
24
25
26

Ibid., XXIX, 10.
Ibid., XX:X:P;:, IS.
Fowler, 345.

Lucretius was not indignant

pi
reason when he spoke of enslavement to the seers who could
27
concoct dream interpretations to fill any man with dread.
Cato

~lthout

expresses the extent of this evil when he wonders ironically how
28
one soothsayer could keep from laughing upon meeting another.
Men beli~ed that the outer world was the scene
of constant Divine interference. 'hey held,
with more or less conviction according to temperament, that every phenomenon ot nature - tor
example, the tailure of the harvest, the flooding of a river, the rising up ot a headwind on
a voyage - was due ~o the caprice of one or
other otfended god. ~
It was not uncommon that civic business ot moment be suspended because the augur maintained that the sky or th. entrails were not
auspicious.
the ignorant.

Nor can we believe that the credulity was limited to
Bulla, who

e~ried

about an image ot Apollo which

he kiss.d and otherwise worshiped, was ot the opinion that no plan
30
was so safe as the one whiob came by night.
Cicero, too, tells
how terrified he was by the prophecy ot a rower who foretold, betore Pharsalia, that the land of Greece would be a welter ot
blood.

31

CrassUs' defeat in his war with the Parthians was at-

tributed to his neglect to follow the auspices.

Pompey was mor-

allp: forced to engage in battle at Philippi by 'favorable'

D.!. !., I, 104tt.
28 ~ieero, De R!!., II, 52.
29 Masson, ~
30 Plutarch, Bulla, transl. by B. Perrin, Heinemann, London; Putnam's Sons, I.Y., 1914, VI, 6.
31 Cicero,£! ~., I, 68.
27

.aspices.

23
All these practice. tended to give deeper roots to the

vague conception of the gods as revengeful, jealous,' even treach.rous •
Superstiton manifested itself in a third way in vague thought
about future life. Some have been inclined to the opinion that
Lucretius' attack on the notions of the punishments of Tartarus
waS exaggerated and unwarranted in view of contemporaneous
beliefs.

Caesar and Catullua are offered as more representative
32
of a common agnostio attitude.
The poet's abnormal emphasis on
the evils of belief in Hell they would attribute to some childhood
impressions derived from Etruscan influences and so vivid as-to
leave him almost obsessed.

However there does seem to be evidence

of religious terrorism based upon Roman conceptions of the afterlife.

As Masson points out, this terrorism would more than likely
33
be expressed in the folk-lore since los.t.
Even so, Cicero tells
us how deeply moved the aUdience was by the briefest mention at
the gloom of Tartarus in the lines of a play.

34

Tyndarus, in the

Captivi, mentions the number of pictures he has seen of the tor~
-.
35
ments ot Hell.
There does seem to be reason, in the light of
this evidence, for admitting the existence of such foreboding
32 W.W. Fowler, Social Life At Rome, Macmillan, N.Y., 1922, 234236.
--33 Masson, 402ft.
34 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, tiransl. by l.E. King, Hein..~
London; Pitnaa's Sons, N.Y., 1927, I, %Ti, 37.
35 Plautus, Captivi, ed. by W.M. Lindsay, Methuen & Co., London,
1900, V, iv, 998f.
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about the future lite, a dread which certainly makes more reasonable the wide spread ot Oriental cults with their emphasis on
rites of puritication.

Perhaps Lucretius does exaggerate the evil,

but there seems to have been a firm foundation for his ideas.
Naturally this concept of the anguish of Hades would be
closely oonnected with another manifestation of superstition, an
exaggerated sense of . sin and ot the wrath ot the gods.
~as

Lucretius

conscious of the significance of this factor when he exclaimed:

o genus infelix humanum, talia divis

cum tribuit facta atque iras adiunxit acerbas!
Quantos tum gemit~s ipsi sibi, quantaque nobis
volnera, quas lacrimas peperere minorbu' nostris. 36
Livy points out in his Proemium the unbearable burden of siB that
oppressed his people, and Horace, too, refers to the evils that
.
37
had come upon his times.
Certainly this feeling WaS strong
during the lawless days through which Lucretius lived.

It would

be most natural for Romans to believe that the gods had deserted
their fatherland because of their social and political offenses,
their fratricidal warfare, and their general neglect of the ancient
pietas.

Such a troubled publio oonscience would not necessarily

imply the influence of superstition, but when coupled with Oriental
expiations it took a definitely superstitious turn.

36 D. R. N. t V, l194ff.
37 !orace: Odes, with commentary by E.O. Wickham, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, I!9l, I, 2.

This conclusion is made evident

by

the last manifestation

of superstition that we shall consider, the brutality and human
sacrifice involved in some expiatory rites intended to avert the
wrath of the gods and thus to purge man of his sense of sin.

A

realization of the significance of this element in Roman religious
life will clarify the reasons for Lucretius' condemnation of the
turpiS religio of his times.

Was he merely waxing poetical when

he described so tenderly the pitiful figure of Iphegenia as she
38

waS led like a ewe to the altar of sacrifice?

Was he resting

hiS opposition to religion solely on a legend, perhaps with the
intention of forestalling such savagery in the future?

The facts

of Roman history make Lucretius' passionate outburst easier to
understand, nor need we believe that he was merely antiCipating
a potential problem.
A "savage sacramental act" was part of the Dionysiac rit39
ual.
Furthermore, human sacrifice is mentioned a number of
times from the period of the punic wars on.

Two Greeks and two

Gauls had been entombed in the Forum Boarium, where human sacrifices were repeatedly performed despite Livyts condemnation of
.
40
such procedure as a most un-Roman rite.
Shortly after Lucretius'
birth the Senate wa. forced to pass a decree prohibiting these
brutal rites, but evidently the decree had little effect.

38
39
40

For in

D. R. ~., I, 84ff.
L.R. Farnell, The Cults of the Greek states, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1909, V,150.
- Livy, XXII, lxvii,S.
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tbe next century Pliny tells us that they still occurred in his
41
time.
Despite Hadrian's effort to abolish human saorifices
throughout the Empire, Pausanias hints rather olearly that they
42
still went on secretly in Greeoe.
We have good reason, therefore,
to believe that the superstitious Oriental rites, which, after all,
were popularized because of the innate though perverted religious
sense of the Roman people, did not rest' satisfied with an expiatory
saorifioe that left the viotim still living.

We oan be sure that

if the authorities had to publicly forbid human sacrifice, there
must have been reason for their action.
Thus we have the completed picture of the problem as it taced
Lucretius.

The critioal issues of the times threw the people

frantically back upon their traditional religion.

This in turn,

being little more than the embodiment of ritualistic minutiae and
formalized procedure, gave free rein to individual tastes and beliefs which, coupled with tear and ignorance, degenerated into the
worst kind of superstitious beliets and practices.

Hence, though

we cannot condone Lucretius' solution, we can at least understand
the reason behind the direction it took and sympathize with the
author who was painfully aware ot the evil he was fighting, though
perhaps just as woefully unaware of the inadequacy of the solution.
That solution we shall now examine and evaluate.
41

Caius Plinius Secundus, Historia Naturalis, Tauchnitius,
Lipsig, 1830, XXX, 3.
42 Pausanias, Description of Greece, transl. by J.G. Frazer,
Macmillan, LOndon, 19l3:-VIII, xxxviii, 7.

PART II
THE LUCRETIAN SOLUTION

CHAPTER I
'!'HE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE GODS

When we speak ot the 'Luoretian solution' to the problem ot
superstition, of course we do not mean to imply that the poet
originated the tonic that he thought would revive afflioted

Ro~e.

-

A critical comparison of the De Rerum Natura with our other
sources ot Epicureanism reveals his olose adherenoe to the dootrines proposed by his Greek Master.

Nor did Luoretius ever in-

tend to take credit for the disoovery of his remedy.

The tact

that he all but deities Epicurus in the introduction to the third
book of his poem, and rejoices that he may follow the firm footprints first left upon the sands of Philosophy, as well as the explicit acknowledgment that "the man of Greeoe" first lifted the
scales of superstition trom the eyes ot mankind, reveal that Lucretiaa laid no olaim to uriginality.

1

Yet, we can speak of the Lucretian solution in as muoh as he
keenly perceived, with all the passion of personal conViction, the

1

~.!.

!., III, 4; I, 63tt.
27

28

souroe of his nationts distress, recognized a oure whioh, in his
opinion, had not yet been given a fair trial, and then presented
it with a vigor that oaptivated the confused minds and hearts of
countless Roman citizens.

In the truest sense of the word he was

a missionary of Epioureanism, an evangelist who implanted the
roots of this philosophy where previously they had taken litt1e
hold.

To this extent we may speak of the Epicurean solution as

'Lucretian'.
The task facing Lucretius, then, was to banish the fear that
waS the souroe of the world's sin and unhappiness.

To do this he
had to start at rock-bottom, with the very oonoept of the gods t
existence and nature.

Having

st~bilized

this fundamental notion,

he advanced to a denial of Divine Providence and causality in the
world - a denial, however, which strangely enough still left room
for a cultus peou1iar to Epicureanism.

Finally, with the founda-

tion and lower structure in plaoe, he raised the tower tor which
the whole edifice had been planned, his denial ot Divine Sanotion.
This was the apex ot the system, the ethical goal toward which the
theological steps had been taken.

These divisions ot the process

are not so nicely made in the poem, but their logical sequence may
be deduced trom a oareful reading, and A$nCe they will constitute
the skeleton of our treatment of the solution as Lucretius saw it.
How preoisely did Lucretius justify his belief in the gods?
To present a complete picture ot Lucretius' reasoning on this

29
point, we shall have to supplement his statements with data taken
from other sources 61 information regarding Epicureanism.

The

disciple sometimes takes a poetic leap and omits premises which
the Master and others preferred to treat explicitly.

Consequently,

we shall occasionally draw on other documents with the purpose of
gaining a clearer and more coherent notion of the poet's dootrine.
Luoretius considered the existence of the gods so certain on
a basis of the Epicurean theory of cognition that he nowhere gives
us a formal proof for it as he does for the denial of Providence.
After treating this general theory of

cognit~on

at same length in

his fourth book, he rests content to desoribe most briefly the way
in which men came to a knowledge of the gods, passing on immedi2 .

ately to his denial of divine intervention in the world.

We

should note in this passage that after describing the double origen of the non-Epicurean concept of the gods - through vision of
them and through inference from natural phenomena - it is only the
second that he attacks, not the first.

He has 'briefly informed us

in two lines of a previous passage that his own refined knowledge
of the gods is also gained through vision; "tenuis enim

natur~

dewn ~Qa,gMlie remota / seQlia, JUt no§tr4s BD2m~ .L1.A mlate
~.

Y*Q,-

Perhaps he was oonscious that a oriticism of the visions

of his opponents would leave his own position open to danger.

2 D. R. N. t V, 1l6lff.
3 Ibid., -V, 148f.
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The primary proof for the existence of the gods in this system rests on its theory of cognition.

Epieurus begins with the

tact that all men have a notion, eonstantlY abiding though not
alWays actual, of the existence of the gods. This notion, aceord4.
to Cicero, is innate in man, not, however, in the technical sense
of later philosophy, as an idea which is imprinted on the mind at
5
birth and then is actuated when a suitable st~ulus occurs.
lather, the word 'innate' describes a deposit of actual cognitions
which occur with such consistency and frequency as to leave an
unmistakeable image in the mind.

These cognitions, which come to

the mind espeCially during the untroubled and undistracted hours
of sleep, when it is most attuned to delicate stimuli, reveal gods
6
of great power and beauty.
How do these concepts of the deities prove their existence?

In the Epicurean theory all concepts are formed by reception of
images' (idola) which we can best describe as films which detach
themselves from their source and fly about with incredible speed.

7

If the atomic structure of the object is of an especially refined
Dature, its idola cannot affect the senses, but make their impresaion directly upon the mind.
~

S

Such is the case in forming the

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, transl. by H. Rackham, Heinemann,
London; JUtnam's Sons, N.Y., 1933, I, xvii, 42-45.
Ct. R.D.Hicks,Stoic ~ Epicurean, Scribner, KY., 1910, 289.
D. R. Ne, V, 1170.
7 lbfae, -IV, 35ff.
8 ~., IV, 722-822.
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idea of the gods.

The concept of them is formed by a constant

stream of extremely sl1btile idola.

These, being of similar repre-

sentative nature, leave the torm of the image unchanged despite
9

the physical succession.
it may happen that there is a confusion ot the idola be10
fore the faculty is atfected.
Thus Lucretius accounts tor fic~ow

titious ideas - ideaS which are objectively real only per partes.
Immediately, then, the question arises: why may not the images ot
the gods be purely subjective?
cretely: "Quid interest utrum
mus?

--

Omnem

~

inanem vocant,

Cicero poses the problem more con-

~

Hippocentauro

~ ~ ~

cogite-

talem conformationem animi ceteri philosophi

~

11

autem.adventum in animos ••• dicitis."

~otum

--

Epi-

curus's answer is to appeal to the constancy of the concept.
12
object of such 'clear vision t must be verified in reality.

The
It

it were fictitious it would be occasional, sporadic, dependent
upon chance combinations of the idola.

There would be no suffi-

cient reason for the fact that an 'anticipation' (prolepsis) is
formed - this is one of Epicurus' s norms for judging truth - unless this 'anticipation' ha.d been built up by a number of similar
13
images derived from real beings.
9 Q. g. N., V, l175ft.
10 Ibid., IV, 735ff.
11 Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I, xxxviii, 105.
12 Epicurus, To Menoechus, ed. by C. Bailey, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1926, #123.
13 Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I, xvi, 43. Confer on this pOint C.
Bailey, The Greek Atomists ~ Epicurus,Clar., Oxf., 1928, 246f.
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Thus we find in the system of Lucretius what we may call a
materialistio ontologism.

The gods are perceived as they are in

themselves, through physical media whioh are exact images of their
natures.

Analogous knowledge, in the strict Soholastio sense

whioh would mean knowledge derived deduotively from oreatures, is
definitely discarded because it would imply Divine oausality, Divine creation.

Lucretius in a passage previously mentioned vio14
lently attaoks a popular form of the argument from causality.

Epiourus brands it as a "false supposition", an unjustified inference which is not based upon the repeated imprint of ldola, but
goes beyond the data supplied by them and consequently is fioti15
Of course, the reason for the vehement rejection of the
tious.
argument is olear: the conoeption of it as a basis for superstitious fear.

This point will beoome more manifest in the following

chapters.
A seoond argument for the existence of the gods is the

~

pri-

ori one explioitly mentioned b~ the Epicurean Velleius in Cioero's
16"
dialogue.
It is based on the theory of isonomia or equal distribution of opposites within an infinite number, so that there
must be as many immortal beings as there are mortal.

Bailey, in

disoussing this argument, gives several passages from Lucretius
Where the prinoiple of isonemia is used in other propositions, for

14 D. R. N., V, l16lff.
15 Epiourus, To Menoeoheus, 1124.
16 Cioero,~-ratura Deorum, I, xix, 50.
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example, to show that there are equal numbers
terent species.

17

o~

animals ot dif-

However, since this argument, with reterence to

the gods, is only virtually contained in

the~poem,

Epicureans themselves do not seem to have proposed

and since the
i~very

vigor-

ously, it need not detain us longer.
In

determinipg the nature ot the gods, Lucretius is, ot

course, guided in his theology by the

e~hical

goal he has set him-

selt - the elimination ot tear that springs from superstition.
The statement that Zeller made ot Epicurus could equally well be .
made of the Roman poet.
Epicurus had also another geaso~ halt aesthetical, halt religious - the wish to see his
ideal ot happiness realized in the person of
the gods, and it is this ideal which determines
the cf~racter o~ all his notions respecting
them.
Just as the universal 'anticipation' of men proves the existence of the gods, so too it reveals the characteristic attributes
of their nature.

Epicurus advised his disciples through Menoeceus

to believe in the blessedness and immortality which common opinion
associated with deity, to predicate of it all that is in harmony
with these two attributes, and deny ot it all that is alien to
19
Herein is contained the simple ~ormula that makes all the
them.
17 D. R. N., II, 532-540. Con~er C. Bailey, Greek Atomists and
Ipicurus, 46lff.
18 I. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, transl. by O.J.
Reichel, Longmans, Green & Oo.~ndon and N.Y., 1892, 466.
19 Epicurus, To Manoeceus, #123.

-

~
-~------------------------------------------------------------------~
34

ethical and theological doctrines that depend upon it quite easy
to understand.

The whole logical process springs from the onto-

logical vision of the gods and the primary notes of unending bliss
contained in that vision.

Lucretius echoes the opinion Of the

Master when he says that it is necessary that a god fftRmortali
aevo summa

~

pace fruatur" , and again when he asks "quid

~

immortalibus atgue beat is gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti?

" 2b

In an analogous sense these two attributes are for the

Epicureans what Ipsum

!!!! is for many Scholastics - the metaphys-

ical essence which distinguishes the Divine Being from all others,
and is conceived as the prima radix from which all other attributes are derived.
What are some of the qualities which the Epicurean predicates
of his gods in virtue of these characteristic at'tributes of immortality and perfect happiness.

First of all, since his concept is

thoroughly anthropomorphic, the gods must have bodies, yet not of
the same atomic density as man's, for this would involve many imperfections.

Therefore,. they will be constituted of the finest

atoms conceivable in order to preserve their indestructability.

21

For the same reason - that they may not suffer fatal blows and
that they may have a supply of new constitutive matter - they are
placed in the intermundia, the regions between the worlds, where

20
21

D. R. N., II, 647; V, l65f.
Ibid.;-V, 148.
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the flow of basio atoms is suffioient for their maintenanoe, thus
relieving them of all the fear that is oonseouent upon the possi22
bility of death.
Here, in abodes suited to their refined natur~
they dwell immune from wind and rain, snow s.nd frost, amid smiling,
23
cloudless skies where nature supplies their every need.
The
whole desoription is olearly reminisoent of Homer's Olympus.
The SaIne two basio attributes, sinoe they eliminate anything
like trouble or oare, preolude all Divine intervention in worldly
24
affairs.
This point will be treated more fully in the following
chapter.

Cicero pithily summarizes the whole Epiourean dootrine

on the gods.
Nihil enim@eus]agit, nullis occupationibus
est implioatus, nulla opera molitur, sua
sapientia et virtute gaudet, habet exploratum
fore se sempe~ oum in max1mis, tum in aeternis
voluptatibus. 5
.
Suoh is the ideal that Luoretius sets up before men - to inspir, them, to free them from fear.

Suoh is the god they are to

approaoh in prayer with hearts untroubled.

Contemplating the

tranquility of Divine life, man sees the wisdom of detaohment
from the sordid business of the world and seeks his happiness in
ataraxia, oomplete freedom from trouble and sooial strife in

22 D. R. N., V, l46f.; Cioero, De Divinatione, II, xvii, 40.
23 J.~. !., V, 153; III, l8ff.-24 Ibia., II, 646; VI, 57ff.
25 "C'I'Ciro,.!2! Natura Deorum, I, xix, 51.
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imitation of the life of the gods.

Lucretius'reaction to the so-

cial confusion of his age seems to have been one of despair, for
his whole ethical solution, trom its theological foundation upwards, places the premium on passivity, inaetion.
How are we to evaluate this theological foundation of Lucretius' solution?

Clearly, the entire validity of the Epicurean

proof for the existence of the gods depends upon a factual premise - the universal concept of the gods, which, be it noted, is
not an analogous

concept~

but a proper one.

In other words, the

notes contained in that concept represent the gods as they are in
themselves, and are not derived deductively from other creatures,
but from a direct vision of the gods themselves.

This tact imme-

diately places the Epicurean in a delicate and dangerous position.
If it is shown that he has no grounds for positing such a vision
of the gods, he is left without a proof for their eXistence, since
there remains only the argument trom isonomia, or counterpoise,
which is a weak and arbitrary one to say the least, and is not
used by Lucretius himself to prove the gods' existence.
Now, we know that in our day absolutely no value would be
placed upon Lucretius' premise, since on a basis of it the vast
majority ot men would logically have to be agnostic.
is simply contrary to ordinary experience.

Such vision

Are we to think,

theretore, that the poet was insincere or deceptive in speaking
of the universal vision of the gods?

In other words, what factual

37
grounds did he, and espeoially Epiourus before him, who spoke explioitly of 'olear vision', have for building upon this basio supposition?
The truth is, probably ninety-nine out of a hundred Romans
in Luoretius' time would have laid olaim to divine visitations in
dreams.

Consequently, he certainly was not wrong regarding the

faot of suoh oonoepts.
-see,
and oould not see

But what he and his predeoessor did not
beoaus~

of the primitive psyohology of

their times, was that these oonoepts had a simple explanation in
the presence of rememorative speoies which, when aotuated, were
combined to form images ot powerful and beautiful beings (anthropomorphio, of oourse) who performed marvelous deeds in keeping
with their extraordinary natures.

We need but reoall that the an-

cient pagan lived in the midst ot his gods - beheld their statues
on every side, felt their presenoe in every phenomenon of nature and we oan understand how easily and readily these naturally acquired images would come to mind when it was relaxed in sleep.
Today only the abnormal person would oonsider suoh imaginative
representations to be real viSitations, while the true and saintlY
mystio would call them suoh only when they were tested by a competent judge of the spiritual lite.
psychology had not

adv~ced

In Lucretius' time, however,

sutficiently to furnish men with a

knowledge ot the operations ot the imagination in torming dream
images, while their natural religious temperament lett them only
too ready to attribute such images to direct divine aotivity.

I!

F ___-----------------------------------------------,
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Here lies the basic weakness in the Luoretian theological system.
Factually, his religious structure was built upon sand, for he is
exposed to the primary objection against all Ontologism: direct
26
cognition of divinity is contrary to expe~ience.
Secondly, Lucretius' philosophical footing is most unsteady
when he tries to divorce the concept of Divinity which he considers legitimate from the concept of Divine causality which he
brands as fictitious.

It will be remembered that the

reason he

justified the objectivity of the first concept was that it was
founded on an 'anticipation' which had to have its sufficient
reason in repeated impressions derived from real beings.

He no-

tably omits to speak of any 'anticipation' which would seem to be
connected with such a constant concept as that of Divine causality, contenting himself with the arbitrary charge that it was due
to false inference.

As a matter of fact, the whole theory of 'an-

ticipations' is definitely arbitrary, since it certainly seems
that even a fictitious idea of a Centaur, for example, produced a
clear 'antioipation', in the minds of the ancients, and therefore
would logically have to depend, in Lucretius' system, on an existing being.

Whether or not a person has a true 'anticipation' in

a given case would, to all appearances, rest upon mere subjeotive
opinion.
This subjectivity is present in the rejection of the validity
,,

"

26

Masson, 271, may be conferred on the matter of this paragraph.
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of inference regarding Divine causality.

Why is Lucretius more

justified in deducing his secondary attributes of the gods than is
the non-Epicurean in deducing the need of Divine activity to explain phenomena.

Of course, Lucretius would reply that his

secondary attributes are in harmony with the primary notes of perfect Divine happiness contained in his 'anticipation', whereas
Divine operation is not.

The answer to this distinction involves

a brief disoussion and definition of the nature of Divine operation and will best be reserved to the last part of the following
chapter.
What Sikes has said of the Master holds equally true for the
disciple: "no doubt Epiourus, if he failed to understand the
nature of the imagination, had at least an ideal which he wished
27
to see realized in the oomplete happiness of the gods".
The
Epioureans erred in their speoulations because they were ataing
at an ethioa1 goal - the liberation of man from superstitious
fear - whioh, we may almost say, determined
ries on the nature of the divine beings.

~

priori their theo-

The concept of the gods

outlined in the preceding pages was the first step taken in the
elimination of that fear because it made it possible for man to
believe in the ancient deities without at the same time being inconvenienoed by the superstitious implications of the ancient -belief.

27

This belief had sprung from the notion of Divine action

Sikes, 109.

~

-~----------------------------------------------------------------------~
40

in the world.

We shall now consider Lucretius' disposal of such

an idea - the second step in his program for destroying superstition.

1'1
' I

CHAPTER II
THE DENIAL OF DIVINE CAUSALITY AND PROVIDENCE

Long before Luoretius'day Demooritus had sounded the theme of
the Q! Rerum Natura when he said that the men of old had been
struok with awe and dread at the sight of thunder, lightning and
other portents of nature, assigning them to the agenoy of the
1

gods.

To this fear Luoretius attributed the rise of religion as

the anoients knew it, with its solemn rites, its shrines and sao2

rifice, its pomp of oeremonious prooessions and elaborate ritual.
In all this the poet saw nothing but seeds of fear and human
anxiety.

If he was to banish these onoe and for all, he must

banish the cause, unreservedly and unflinohingly.

Time and again

he reveals his consciousness of the faot that it is a 'harsh dootrine' he proposes, a dootrine that smaoks of impiety, but there
is no other course left but to drink the bitter oup, sweetened at
3
the lip with the honey of his song.
For a proper understanding of Luoretius' position we must reoall the mistaken ideas that were popular regarding the influenoe

'Ii
Ii,

Sextus Empirious, Against the Ph~SiOists, transl. by R.G.Bury,
Harvard Univ. Press, CambrIage, ass., 1936, I, 24.
2 D. R. N., V, 1161.
3 Ib1d.,-III, 18; I, 936ff.

1

-

41

Ii

,..,..-

--------------------------------------------------------------------~

42

of the gods in worldly affairs.

There was no true concept of the

dignity and purposiveness of Divine activity in the universe.

The

godS, being anthropomorphic, were subject to human whims, and manifested the fact in their capricious, tyrannical manipulations of
nature.

Stoicism undoubtedly attempted to counteract this defi-

ciency with its notion of the all-pervasive world spirit, informing all things with some degree of divine dignity.

But here, too,

there was another evil,- that of fate relentlessly dooming all
creatures to their appointed ends.

This was no doctrine to free

the common man from his fear of a cruel taskmaster ready to sweep
down upon him with avenging whip if a small item in his rigid
ceremonial was inadvertently omitted.

The Stoic ideal of co-oper-

ating with destiny rather than being dragged to the same end by
it, did not make it any less depressing in the eyes of Lucretius.
He preferred freedom from all coercion, physical or moral, and
chose to find it in the same solution that Ennius had voiced
before him: "Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam caelitum,
~

.!.2!

~

--4
curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus".

Of the two species of Divine operation in the world, one,
Divine craftsmanship, had been particularly championed by Plato
in the person of the Demiourgosj the other, Divine PrOVidence,
was contained in the Stoic doctrine of Divine 'forethought' (pronOia).

Against both of these notions the

4 Cicero, De Divinatione, I, lviii, 132.

Epicure~ns,

as testifies

1:1'
"

,..----------------------------------------------------------------------,
their spokesman Valleius, were implacable enemies.

5
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They felt

that any freedom that may have been left to man by the first was
utterly destroyed by the second.

As Lucretias saw the world, there

waS no need of either expression of Divine operation.

Nature,

operating through the chance collisions of prime bodies, sufficed
to explain all beings, probably even the gods themselves who also
were of atomic structure.

Ignorance of this power of nature was

the very cause of man's blind attribution of all events to the
6
power of the gods.
From this spring welled up all the evils of
superstition, with its brutal rites and anxious searching for new
forms of expiation and propitiation.
The first argument offered by Lucretius against Divine providence is based on the same observation that Ennius made before
him:

tt~

abest tt •

si dei curent,

~

bonis sit, male malis, quod

~

How can we attribute to the gods, asks the poet, a world

so full of imperfections, evil and pain?

Man has only to look

about him to see what poor workmanship he calls divine.

How much

of this immense world of ours is sheer waste, rendered impassable
by its greedy mountains, rocky expanses and unhealthful
inhabited only by beasts hostile to man.
tr~ting

marsh-lan~

Scorching heat and pene-

cold drive man to a comparatively small section of the

earth's surface where he must struggle against bramble and weed to

5 Cicero, ~ Natura Deorum, I, viii, 18.
6 Q.R. N.,·V, 11S6f.,
7 Cicero, ~~ Natura Deorum, III, xxxii, 79.
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raise his

sc~t

crop, otten only to see it withered by the sun or

blighted by the frost.

How wretched compared with the dumb beast

is the lot of man who is brought forth amid mother's pain and -depends so long on the indulgent care of parents; who must endure
disease, hostile seasons, and untimely death; who must build his
weapons and walls to protect his dear possessions, while nature
supplies the animals, often his cruelest foe, with all they need
8
from their birth.
What kind of Divine goodness does that god manifest whose
tatal lightning bolt envelopes the innocent in flames and leaves
the wioked untouched?

Or what Divine wisdom is Jupiter's when

he spends his strength in the bolt that strikes the empty desert
sands or the unoffending waves of the sea?

What holiness is there

in shattering his own temples, shrines and images?

9

The second argument of Luoretius is implied in the last passage cited.

He asks triumphantly why Jupiter never shoots his

lightning bolt when the sky is clear and why he must always use
10
thunder when he decides to strike.
Stated more abstractly, his
argument would seem to be that the very order and consistency in
natural phenomena prohibits the notion of Divine causality, since
it would involve the limitation of Divine power.

8 D. R. N., V, 195ff.
9 Ibia., II, 1102ff.; VI, 4l7ff.
o Ibid., VI, 400ff.

This pOSition

~---------------------------------------45~
ot the poet is signifioant not only beoause it stands in suoh
strong contrast with the conviotions ot other philosophers who
have used the same premises to prove the necessity ot Divine operation, but also because it reveals so clearly, as we shall see,
Luoretius' preoooupation with the idea of caprioious gods.
In his third argument the poet asserts that the creation and

regulation ot the world would be above and beyond the power ot the
gods.

Whatever other attributes or perfections he may have given

them, he did not see fit to aSSign to one or all of them omnipo11
though certainly this would be in perfect harmony with
tence,
the happiness of Jupiter, god supreme.

Onoe again we see how Lu-

cretius' ethioal objective crippled his theologioal speculation.
At any rate, the poet of Epioureanism can conoeive of no god
powerful enough to rule and guide this magnitioent universe ot
ours.

Little though he may realize it, he voioes an implicit pro-

test against the petty,. tinite gods ot ancient Rome.
quis regere immensi summam, quis habere protundi
indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas,
quis pariter oaelos omnis oonvertere et omnis
ignibus aethariis terras suttire teraois,
omnibus inve loois esse omni tempore praesto,
nubibus ut tenebras taoiat oaelique serena
oonoutiat sonitu, tum fi~ina mittat et aadis
saep. suas disturbet •••
Furthermore, even granted a god oould guide this universe,

11 Ibid., V, 87ff.
12 IbId., II, l095tf.

~------------------------------~
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bOW could he ever possibly have

ore~ted

it?

For even a Divine

wor.lanen must have a pattern, a model for the thing he wishes to
make.

The world would have to exist as an exemplum before it

could be made; otherwise the gods would not know what to desire.

13

The fourth and last argument offered by Luoretius rests upon
tbe nature of the gods as outlined in the previous chapter.

Prov-

idence would be out of harmony with the charaoteristio attribute
of Divine happiness whioh oonsists in perfeot peace, perfect
14
Epiourean ataraxia or tranquility prooeeds from the
rest.

ab~

'.

senoe of trouble, and more fundamentally from the absenoe of desire whioh is the root of trouble.

To remove this 'evil of desire'

is really the only objeot of all positive pleasure sought by man,
for "the magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of
15
all pain".
Simplioity ot life, so frequently ohampioned by Horace, is merely the logioal and praotical applioation of the Epicurean dogma that the fewer desires a man is afflioted with, the
happier will be the life he passes.
Now if the gods ever ohose to oreate and then to govern the
universe, it must have been beoause they had a desire, a pain,
whioh had to be assuaged by Divine operation.

But what desire of

novelty, asks Luoretius, could be enkindled in the heart of a

13 Ibid., V, l8lff.
14 DIOgenes Laertiua, Epi8urus, transl. by R.D.Hioks, Heinemann,
London, 1925, X, 76,'77.
15 Ibid., X, 131; 139.

I

"

I

"

,...---------------------------------------------------------------------,
47

being who had suffered no annoyance, no dissatisfaction in time
past?

Was his life hid in darkness and sorrow until the light of

the world's oreation shone upon him, bringing with it relief at
last?

Surely, too, the gods had nothing to expect from poor, in16
significant man, the fruit of this labor.
Where then is the
reason for such unbecoming trouble?
Thus the Epicurean oonoludes that since the gods Oan look for
no good in this world of ours, sinoe their nature forbids even the
desire for any good, then neoessarily there oan be
causality nor Divine Providence.

"Omnis enim per

neithe~

~

Divine

divom natura

neoessest / inmortali aevo summa oum paoe fruatur / semota ab
17nostris rebus seiuncta longe".
One maJor oonsequence that follows from. this oonolusion is
that Luoretius must logioally deny all finality in the universe.

! I
••

Hicks remarks that the Peripatetics were included among the ohief
antagonists of the Epicureans, beoause they maintained that the
world was unconsoiously working to an end despite the fact that it
·18
operated without Providenoe.
Lucretius was logioal at least and
saw that the rejeotion of one meant the rejection of the other.
To admit finality in the operations of nature would necessarily
imply the need of someone to ordain that nature to a particular
end rather than to any other, else there would be no suffioient
16 D. R. N., V, l65ff.
17 Ibid.,-II, 646ff.
18 Hicks, 304.

1

reaSon for this precise tendency.

Certainly the world could not

have established its own end, sinoe this would involve the contradiction of giving itself what it did not have of itself.

Conse-

quently there is no course left but to deny the presence of finality entirely.

!!

"~oerte

negue oonsilio primordia rerum / ordins

~

~

guaeque sagaci mente locarunt / B!£ quos quaegue darent
19
pepigere profecto".

~-

This denial of finality is particularly stressed with regard
to the limbs of the human body and its faoulties.

Lucretius

grants that usefulness determines the nature and existence of many
things whioh man has made, suoh as utensils and weapons, because

I

they depend on experience and the rational adaptation of means to

II'
II

end.

But those

t~ings

which do not depend on experience

~uae

prius ipsa nata dedere suae post notitiam utilitatis") do not have

-

-

any purposiveness.

20

-

Again this is logically true if there is no

Supreme Designer, with foreknowledge of their utility, to ordain
them to their end.
Sikes does not seem to recognize the position of Luoretius
when he says:
It is strange that the Epicureans should not
have here allowed a 'purpose for Nature, even
if divine purpose was anathema. Their crude
ideas on general biology are in stark contrast

~--.----------------------------------~
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with their sane conceptions of human development. 2l
.
Yet, if divine purpose in the world is rejected, what other purpose is possible?

Whatever else it may be, one thing is certain:

it must be above the Nature whose purpose it is, unless we are to
admit the impossible situation of Nature giving itself what it
does not have.

No non-volitional being can determine itself to

one end rather than to another without a violation of the basic
principle of causality.
With the rejection of design in the world's origin and development Lucretius was forced to propose that only the chance
combinations of primordial bodies can account for the order and
precision of our universe.

The atoms, falling in a straight line,

at various times swerved to an infinitesmal degree from their
downward course to mingle with one another.

This last detail is

a departure from the doctrine of nemocritus which allowed no lat22
eral motion whatever.
This swerve, which proceeds entirely from
the nature of the atoms themselves, is the cause of two things:
the formation of the world in general and the freedom of the will
in particular.

23

For it was inevitable that the repeated experi-

ments of the primordial bodies in one combination after another
should eventuallY result in the structure of the universe as we

Sikes, l45f.
II, 2l6ff.; Diogenes Laertius, X,.43.
D.R.N., II, 25lff.

~.I.!.,

-- -

:I

know it.
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24

With this statement of Lucretius' dependence on chance to eXplain the world's origin and activity, our presentation of his
dootrines regarding Divine operation is oomplete.

We may now con-

sider the main flaws in this article of his theological creed, so
fundamental in his solution of the problem of superstition.
His first argument against Divine causality rested upon the
fact that the imperfections in the world's oonstruction and operation were too numerous to admit the agency of the gods.
look certainly has not been unique in the history of man.

His outThe

problem of evil and pain is as troublesome in our own age as it
was in his.

W. should note at the outset, however. the one-sided

view which the poet takes toward the world about him, for nowhere
in the lines referred to previously does he mention the beauty and
fruitfulness of nature in its many aspects.

It was a narrow judg-

ment indeed that concentrated on the regions of the earth olosed
to man and neglected the

attrac~iveness

of the land which was al,

together sufficient for his needs.

How different from the unpreju-

!:

I"l
~

,

diced attitude of Virgil, Horace and the many other writers of the
time whose Simple delight with the charms of nature captivates
their readers in every age, simply because it is the natural expreSSion of man's universal observation.

24

Ibid., V, 422ff.
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Presoinding from any dootrines based on revelation and discussing the question on

8

purely philosophioal plane, we oan say

that the primary flaw in Luoretius' position is his ,failure to realize that even the evils he enumerates may be permitted by the
supreme Law-giver Who draws men, through them, to
hereafter.

8

higher life

The physical pain and saorifioe whioh are so prominent

in man's life from the oradle to the grave oan be ordered to a
good whioh more than oompensates for them.

Beoause man has a

f~ee

will, he oan ohoose to use or misuse the ciroumstances of his
"

life, to bear or evade its hardships, and aocordingly to merit reward or punishment.

He is the prinoe of all worldly creation, for

he has the physioal freedom to take pain and use it to glorify and
love his Creator, thereby earning his crown.

Surely there is

nothing unworthy of God in blessing a creature with a quality so
so olosely resembling his own supreme attribute, Freedom.

Is God

to be limited in the number of ways he may refleot His own Goodness in oreatures?

With this fundamental point clear, we oan say

that all physical disoomfort oan be used by man to wonderful advantage, and therefore oannot be said to be without reason.

Of

oourse, those who believe in the original fall of man have the
further knowledge that pain was not in the original plan of God
but was brought

Oll

by man himself.

However, this knowledge in-

volves revelation and is beyoAd the sphere of mere philosophy.
In his second argument Luoretius wondered why Jupiter never

IShot his lightning bolt when the sky was olear and why he had to

i:1

52
use thunder whenever he decided to strike.

He is rebelling against

hiS religious heritage which involved capricious gods who indulged
their whims and impulses in the workings ot nature.

The thought

never seems to have dawned upon him that the order ot the universe
is merely the expression ot Divine Wisdom, acting through natural
laws implanted in the substances of things.

He seems to think

that the constancy characteristic ot natural phenomena excludes
Divine activity, which, it is implied, should exercise itself
without law.

As though Divine operations could not be orderly,

manifesting God's power not through capricious interference, but
through the movements ot bodies naturally following their laws.
So eager was he to establish the principle
of natural law as against the idea of the arbitrary workings ot divine beings in the world
that he did not stop to ask whether it was not
itself reconcilab~~ with a less naive conception of divinity. ,
Lucretius attributed to ignorance of the causes of things the
26
belief in Divine creation and providence.
His task and glory,
he claims, is to cast the light that will dispel that ignoranoe.
Yet, when all has been said, as cogently and paSSionately as he
oan, the mystery is still there.

True, he has-revealed the pres-

ence and working ot 'law', and undoubtedly has struck a hard blow
at the common superstitious notion of capricious deities, but his

25 Bailey, Greek Atomists
26

D.~.

N.,

I,

~ E¥icurus, 475.
152ft.; V, 1161 f.; VI, 54ff.

I

I
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achievement merely clarifies the terms, prepares the ground for
the real problem, the explanation of that

'lawt~

Like many a mod-

ern scientist, Luoretius is so enthralled by the progress he has
made in revealing the laws of nature that he believes he has eliminated the need of Divine oausality when really his need for it,
to give reason to his own prinoiples, is greater than ever.
For what are Luoretius' principles?

There are fixed laws, he

maintains, which reveal themselves in the various aspects of nature.

For example, when the atoms unite to form the bodies about

us, they do so in suoh fashion that the bodies are able to resist
27
blows which disintegrate less perfect combinations.
Once the
bodies are formed, their manner of propagation is so established
by law that only bodies of the same struoture can be produoed by
28
We do not
them. Thus a tree begets a tree and a man a man.
find monstrosities - men with the shapes of beasts, or with
29
branches instead of arms.
When a small body is produced by a
large body of the same species, its development is gradual, not
30
.
sudden, and follows a fixed pattern.
The environment for each
species is set by law, so that each may find all the material necessary for its growth and progress, the fish in the sea, trees in
31
the fields, mind in the human body.
There are inviolable and
I

27 D. R. N. t I, 24lff.
28 ibiu.,-I, 169ff.
29 lbId., II, 700ff.
30 Ibid., It 188ff.
31 Ibid., V, 126ff.

I
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unchanging laws that set limits of growth and decay, change the
seasons of the year and steer the sun and moon in their courses.

32

Now what must we conclude from these facts of experience?
There must be some sufficient reason why substances of a determined nature come into being and why they act within such precise
limits.

Surely Lucretius' blind Chance is not the answer.

A

chaos of falling atoms is not an explanation for the origi,n of
bodies of intricate and delicate construction.

One would have to

presume that out of all these types of primordial bodies, those of
complementary natures happened to come together, and then, out of
an infinite number of possible combinations, by their own power,
without any intelligent guidance, took up the exact positions required to form the most complex organisms that operated in the
most complex but harmonious patterns.
for the human mind to accept.

This solution is too much

A person could far more reasonably

expect that by throwing thousands of tiny metal parts into the
air, he would finally see an ordinary machine like a watch ticking
upon the ground.
Perhaps it was a consciousness of the inadequacy of his argument that prompted Lucretius to speak of Natura creatrix et ~33
bernans as the source of all this order and regularity.
This

32
33

..

£.

R. N., V, 55ff.; I, 551ff.; II, 169; V, 76.
Ibid., II, 1117; V, 77 •
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poetic symbol covered up, to some extent, the patent weakness of
his

metaphysics~

But when the symbolism is stripped away and the

brutal question asked: "Is nature or is it not a being endowed
with the intelligence needed to account for phenomena?", then Lucretius would be forced to admit that nature is no more than the
very forces of the bodies she is said to construot and guide.
The problem remains, clearer perhaps than before he revealed the
lews of nature, but just as muoh in need of an explanation.

Lu-

oretius' insistenoe upon 'laW' automatioally renders his solution
by Chance untenable.
Even so small, yet so fundamental a thing as the olinamen or
swerve is inoomprehensible without some sufficient reason for
this departure from the ordinary downward course of the atoms.
If the power for the swerve is contained within the atom itself,
then the atom has a determined quality which must have a sufficient reason.

Unless it were determined to swerve, it would not

do so rather than not.

But whence came the determination?

Surely

the atom alone is no sufficient explanation, for if it were, it
would be absolute, unoaused, and we would meet the contradiotion
of an absolute, finite being - a being suffioient unto itself,
but whioh acquires perfections it did not have before.

But since

it oannot have given itself these perfections, these aotualities
of previous potenoy, therefore they must have been given by some
Being who had them in some superior way, and thus was able to
share them.

Consequently, the atom is showa, by its finite

natur~
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not to be absolute, but dependent upon and determined by another.
We see, then, that the very premises of Lucretius' second argument, which rested on natural laws, make it imperative that we
admit Divine causality, and rejeot his ultimate explanation by
Chanoe.
ii'

The third argument of Lucretius against Divine operation in '
the world was based on two assumptions: that the universe is teo
vast for any god to rule, and that the oreation of the world would
need a pre-existing model.

These assumptions would be unjustified

if it could be shown that there is an infinite, End. therefore, omnipotent God - a thought whose Significance does not seem to have
registered on the poet's mind.

For an infinite God, the task of

ruling a finite universe would be no task at all.

And certainly

-

the oomprehensive knowledge of the infinite perfections oontained
in His own essenoe, and of the diverse ways in which these perfections oould be participated by creatures, would offer him the exemplary ideas needed in creation.

Thus the argument of Lucretius

collapses when his assumptions are shown to be invalid.
The fourth and last argument of Lucretius against Divine
providence may be stated briefly thus: the perfect happiness of
the gods would be incompatible with Divine labor, since this would
imply a desire of some good, and the trouble taken to satisfy that
desire.

Again the poet's over-sight of the possibility of an

infinite God lies at the root of his position.

The gods as he

~--------------------~
57
conceived them were anthropomorphic.

If they act at all, it must

be exactly, not analogously as man acts.
With easy but unscrupulous ridioule theY~he
EpioureansJignored any notion of Divine action, except the childish one of a man-like
artificer toiling with hammer and anvl1. 34
Now a God of infinite beatitude, of course, cannot desire to
acquire any good, since all goodness is found in His own essence.
To this extent Lucretius' reasoning was sound.

But he failed to

see that God could freely desire not to acquire, but to share His
Divine goodness with creatures.

This would be perfectly compat-

ible with infinite beatitude, since it would merely mean God's
contemplation of His own goodness as reflected in and participated
by other beings.

This kind of 'desire' is no contradiction be-

cause it does not involve an effort to satisfy the pain of longing.

Whether or not God, from all eternity, freely decided to

create those other beings, His own infinite happiness is in no
way affected; it remains equally full whether a creature comes
into being or not, for the novelty is not in God, but outside God.
He Himself is not changed.

The ultimate reason for this quality,

altogether peculiar to God, is the infinitude of His goodness
which always contains the perfections involved in either of two
disjunctive courses of action, no matter which one He decides to
follow.

Thus, even if God does not create, He nevertheless con-

tains the perfection of creating.

Actual creation would not add

34 Masson, I, 272.
II"
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to His goodness, but only to the extrinsic, participated goodness
noW found outside God.

Consequently, God is different from man in

this, that He can, out of infinite love of His own beauty, share
it without any change in Himself, but
participates in it.

o~ly

in the term which now

Thus, divine 'labor' is seen to be only anal-

ogously like the labor of man, and, therefore, perfectly consis- .
tent with divine beatitude.
With his denial of divine providence Lucretius drove a long
nail, he thought, into the coffin of superstitious fear;

There is

no reason to dread a god who cannot harm or even desire to harm
you.

This was the aspect of providence whioh Lucretius stressed.

Cicero preferred to emphasize another.

In his dialogue, Q! Natura

Deorum, Cotta, a contemporary of both Cicero and Lucretius, is
replying to the Epicurean Velleius.
Epicurus vero ex an1mis hominum extraxit radicitus religionem cum dis inmortalibus et
opem et gratiam sustulit. Cum enim optimam
et praestantissimam Daturam dei dicat esse,
negat idem esse in deo gratiam: tollit id quod
maxime proprium est optimae praestantissimaeque
naturae. Quid enim mel ius aut quid praestantius bonitate et beneficentia? Qua cum carere
deum vultis, neminem deo nec deum nec hominem
carum, neminem ab eo amari, neminem diligi
vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines a deis,
sed ipsi dei inter se ab aliis alii neglegantur)5
Lucretius may have attempted to remove the source of fear, but he
actuallY destroyed the source of hope.
35

He did not realize that

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I, xliii, 121.
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people will not be any the less fearful when 'capricious gods are
removed.
them?

How do they know what the future is going to bring to

Exile, death of a dear one, ruined crops - all the evils

that Lucretius sees in nature, all the miseries will still be .
there, and, what is most important, men will not have even the remotest possibility or hope of avoiding them.

With gods, even ca-

pricious gods, men have some hope of averting evil, or at least
they think they have.

But in the Lucretian system, for all prac-

tical purposes, the gods may as well be non-existent, since there
is no place left for human relationship with them.
Perhaps Lucretius and the other Epicureans were aware of the
spiritual vacuum they had left in the souls of men.

At any rate

they tried to offer some consolation with the thought that man
could derive great good from the contemplation of the gods even
though, of course, he could not

e~pect

any direct help from them.

The vision of beings enjoying perfect tranquility of SOUl, perfect
peace, perfect happiness would be an inspiration, the Epicurean
36
felt, for a man to imitate their mode of life.
It is obvious
that an ordinary man, afflicted with the multiple tribulations of
daily life, could find little solace in this purely speculative
form of prayer, which on the admission of the Epicurean teachers
themselves was reserved to the select rew who would retire from

36

Cf. Hadzits, "Lucretian Theory of Providence", The Classical
Weekly, IX, #19 (March, 1916), l46ff.; also Bailey, Greek
Atomists ~ Epicurus, 479.
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the world for contemplative purposes.

The vast majority of men

could not live such a sheltered life, and for them Epicurean
prayer could be no enticement.

This prayer, with its dubious ben-

efits, was a poor and inadequate substitute for the consolations
of the traditional prayer and worship that were based on the notion
of divine providence.

CHAPTER III

THE DENIAL OF DIVINE SANCTION
Having considered in the two previous chapters the theological foundation of Luoretius t attaok on superstition, we turn now
to the cUlmination of his speculations, the denial of divine
sanotion.

Belief in divine providence was the inner fortification

of superstitious fear of the gods.

When this had been demolished,

the poet was ready to meet the enemy hand to hand.

Dread of tem-

poral and tternal punishments for transgressions, Lucretius felt,
was the chain that kept man in the dust.

When this would be shat-

tered, man could rise and breathe freely.

No longer would a shad-

ow fall upon his every pleasure; no longer would he seek in sin
an escape from the anxiety that oppressed him.

In the poetts

plan this liberation was the last step in establishing a proper
relationship with the gods, a relationship worthy of their true
nature and of man's dignity.
It will be well at the outset to have a clear concept of the
meaning of san'ction, for we shall see that it was in corrupting
its meaning that Lucretius made his initial error.

In general,

the word signifies two things: reward and punishment.

These are

proportioned to the magnitude of the good or evil act performed.
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If the sanction is considered antecedently to the act, it constitutes a motive which encourages man to good and deters him from
evil.

If considered subsequently to the act, it is the actual re-

ward or punishment. These two aspects of sanction may be termed
efficacious motivation and just retribution.

Both must be in the

mind of any legislator who seriously intends the observance of a
law.

Without a SUfficient motive, based on a just retribution, no

subject will be willing to undertake the sacrifices entailed in
abiding by the legal restrictions.
In the case of divine sanotion these notes are present in a
proportionately higher degree.

Even on a basis of natural law,

prescinding from any kind of revelation, we can deduoe that the
God who must have created the world and who is needed as a sufficient reason for its continued existence, intended that His creatures abide by the legislation written in the natures of things.
These natures may not be abused, for abuse would be a violation of
His manifest intention in making them.

Consequently, God, as a

most wise and just Legislator, must have a sanction for His law,
a sanction which constitutes an adequate incentive and just retribution for the subjects of that law.

Yet the rewards and punish-

ments of this life are obviously inadequate, since so often the
lot of the oriminal is better than that of the virtuous.
fore, the adequate sanction must consist in reward or
to be received in the next life.

There-

punis~ent

Only such a sanction can provide

a SUfficient incentive for a man to forego in this life great
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personal satisfactions that are outside the law. l
This brief outline describes divine sanction as it has been
generally conceived by men.

All through pagan times these notes

"I

have been verified generically, though they may have been more or
less·confused in different civilizations.

Virgil, for instance,

clearly makes provision for th. condemned and for the blessed in
his Lower World.

Lucretius himself, if asked for an eaplicit

opinion, would probably have agreed that this is an accurate picture of the popular concept.
But what do we find implicitly in his poem?

Whether inten-

tionally or not, he nowhere speaks of the reward which according
to the traditional view was reserved for those who
divine laws.

ab~de

by the

This is a remarkable point, though it does not seem

to have made great impression on critics through the centuries.
Should we attribute it to a deliberate intention of the poet to
stress only the depressing aspect of the after-life 'in order to
strengthen his own ease?

Or is it more reasonable to think that

perhaps this was the aspect uppermost in the minds of his superstitious countrymen?

If the hope of reward had gradually been over-

shadowed by fear of punishment, Lucretius would be merely echoing
the mood of his times and would be somewhat justified in his
attitude toward divine sanction.

1

Certainly a view which makes of

On the subject of sanction confer J. Donat, S.J., Ethica GeneraliS, Rauch, Oeniponte (Innsbruck), 1920, 112-120.
----
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the gods no more than fierce avengers is enough to drive any man
who is solicitous for the happiness of his people to the opposite
extreme, a complete denial of divine sanction.

As has been

pointed out in a previous chapter, it does seem clear that there
was a predominant wave of religious terrorism in Rome, due especially to the apparent desertion of the city by the gods as manifest in the political and social distress of the period.

This

would very well account for the negative viewpoint which Lucretius
takes toward life after death.
Whatever the reason may be, the fact is clear: Lucretius
twisted the true notion of divine sanction so that it signified
2

only the stern punishment meted out by cruel taskmasters.

The

picture he paints of Acheron is an interesting though depreSSing
one.

How often he speaks, in one WaY or another, of the tenebras

Orci, where in the black pit of Tartarus the pallid spirits
3
dwell.
When he offers his own doctrine on death as an endless,
impersonal sleep, he asks: "numguid horribile aEParet,
videtur guicguam,

~

omni somno securius exstat?".

4

~

triste

If the poem

were the only extant piece of ancient literature, we would be led
to think that there had never been any idea of the Elysian Fields.
Certainly the gloomy after-life described by Lucretius leaves no
place for them.

2
3
4

He never mentions any hope of future happiness.

D. R. N., V, 87; VI, 63.
Ibid.,-I, 115, 123; III, 42, 966, 978; IV, 170; VI, 251.
Ibid., III, 976f.
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There is only: "scire licet nobis nil esse in morte timendum nee
5-----miserum rieri qUi ~ !!1 posse".
If his idea of the Lower World
was the popular one, then he had reason rorsaying that the gods
of the common people brought only groans, wounds and tears.
Undoubtedly the vagueness or Greco-Roman thought on the subject or the arter-life is accountable in large part ror Lucretius'
attitude.

There were probably many in the poet's day who would

still prerer with Achilles to be a serf among the living than king
among the dead.

Although the Romans, in their cult of the Manes,

attributed to departed spirits a life more or less happy, still it
was a confused, shadowy sort of existence in which no provision
seems to have been made even for the retention or personal identity.

Such being the case, it would be no strange thing ror many

pious souls, under the influence or superstitious fear, to accentuate the unpleasant aspect of Orcus.
Scholars seem divided on the question of belief in an afterlife among the Romans of Lucretius' time.

Caesar certainly denied

ruture existence, although he consented to the title of Jupi~er
6
Divus berore hi~ death.
It is difficult to say whether men like
Lucretius and the Great Dictator were "the exception rather than
7
the rule", or whether they represented "the trend of Greco-Roman

Ibid., III, 866f.
Bellum Catilinae, transl. by J.C.Rolre, Heinemann,
London; Putnam's Sons, New York, 1920, LI, 20.
7 Fowler, Social Lite At~, 347.
5
6

~ust,
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thought ••• toward a doubt or denial of future life".8

Cicero

seemed to waver between agnosticism in his earlier years and at
least a temporary belief toward the end of his life, when the loss
of Tullia drove him to seek consolation in the thought of her survival after death.

9

His attitude is probably representative of

many public figures in Roman life who simply did not take time
under pressure of their duties to think seriously of the matter.
Certainly the common people at least seemed to have suffered f-rom
an eXaggerated fear of hell and punishment.
Lucretius Wished to destroy this tear of Acheron with all its
sad consequences, the fear "funditus humanam qui vitam turbat
imo / omnia suffundens mortis nigrore negue ullam /

!!!!! liquidam puramgue relinquit".

10

~

~

volupta-

The thunder could not roar,

nor the tempests blow without stirring benighted souls to the
dreadful thought that the punishment for their sins was at hand.

11

In Lucretius' opinion, not only did this empty fear banish all
happiness from its victim's heart, it actually drove him to sin.
For to him poverty and humble position seemed to be a foretaste
of what death had in store, and therefore they must be avoided by
any means possible, even though sinful.
turpis .nim ferms contemptus et acris egestas
Sikes, 135.
_
Cf. F.A.Sullivan, S.J., "Cicero's Thoughts On Immortality",
Thought, XVII, #65 (June, 1942).
10 D. R. N., III, 38ff.
p.J. Ibid., -V, l2l8ff.
8
9
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semota ab dulci vita stabilique videntur
et quaei iam leti portas cunctarier ante;
unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti
effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse,
sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque
conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes;12
Such being the case, fear of hell must be banished.

But

first Lucretius was called upon to give some reason for the prevalence of that fear.
some foundation.

Surely such a universal belief must haTe

The poet reveals this foundation and shows how

it has been misinterpreted by men.

We recall that according to

Lucretius idola or images are cast off by all things.

Now it fre-

quently happens, the poet explains, that the images of living
bodies retain, their form after those bodies have died.

When men

are touched by these images, especially in sleep, they are led
through ignorance of natural causes to believe that the persons
13
represented still exist in another world.
Once this true explanation is understood, there is no need to be further disturbed
by such visions.

In more ways than one we realize how Lucretian

psychology was a means to his ethical end.
With divine sanction out of the way, the Epicureans naturally
had to propose some substitute which would still motivate men to
lead virtuous lives.

Here is where we shall find the greatest

weakness of the system.

For in the last analysis the only sanc-

tion offered by the poet is merely a suasive one.
12
13

Ibid., III, 65ff.
Ibid., IV, 30ff.

It lacks the
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foroenecessary to move men, under stress of severe temptation, to
choose the right

cou~se

rather than the self-satisfying evil one.

The poet must have been conscious of his weakness on this point,
for he does not state explicitly the nature of the obligation to
do good and avoid wrong.

We are forced to deduce it from various

passages of his poem.
It is well to note that there was little difference between
the actual virtues inculcated by orthodox Epicureanism and Stoicism, though the foundations supporting them were vastly different.

Fortitude, temperance, justice and prudence were ze~lously
14
encouraged by the Master and his disciples.
Consequently, since
the ideal was a noble one, we are justified in seeking some suit-

able motivation for carrying that ideal into action.
Immediately we are faced with the startling fact that the
only reason for a good life is 'pleasure'.

Whereas the Stoic

prized virtue for its own sake, the Epicurean, to use the Founder's
own strong expression, would "spit upon the Good and those who
15
fruitlessly admire it, whensoever it causes no pleasure n •
The
only good to be found in virtue is its power to produce the tranquility of mind essential to hap'Ciness.

Of course, we must aV,oid

the crude error of conceiving pleasure as gross satisfaction of

14
15

Cf. Bailey, Greek Atomists and Epicurus, 509-515.
Athenaeus, Delpnosophlstae, transl. by C.B. Gulick, Heinemann,
London; Putnam's Sons, New York, 1933, XII, 547a.
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the senses.

Epicurus was careful to guard against such an inter-

pretation which was commonly applied by his enemies.

A happy life,

according to him, consisted in the perfect harmony of the whole
An excessive indulgence of the lower impulses would only

man.

lead to pain.

Hence the necessity for temperance, which, though

an evil in itself, was, as Bailey well puts it, ffderivatively
worthy of choice because it contributes to the highest pleasure
16
of body and mind".
Pleasure and the loss of pleasure in this life, therefore,
constitute- the only sanction proposed by Lucretius.
and the

sam~

It is at one

time the norm and the motive of right action.

If

the soul that is in the darkness of superstition will only look
for this light it will find the panacea for all the troubles that
beset its path through life.
What will h.e see? What is the moral standard
that will become clear to him, the sanction
of right living that will grip his conscience?
It is simply the conviction that as this life
is all we have in pasr~ present, or future,
it must be used well. (

i

I:
lil.1

The Epicurean sanction as here stated by Fowler is rather
vague.

Lucretius is somewhat more specific in his poem, though

never sufficiently so.

As he conceived it, the great manifesta-

tion of the good, and consequently, of the happy life is a mind

16
17

Bailey, Greek Atomists
Fowler, Social Life At

~ Epicurus,
~, 330.

510.
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at peace.

The wicked will never enjoy the tranquility which we

have seen is the very essence of beatitude.

The reason is twofold.

First of all, his excesses will be in themselves a source of
pain, since the more a man indulges his passions, the less satisfaction he finds in the disordered pleasure he enjoys.
he becomes the slave of his desires.
cretius dwells vividly on this point.

In truth,

In a remarkable passage Lu-

The victim of lust and

passion is like Tityos with the birds of prey gnawing at his
belly; the power-mad politician is another Sisyphus rolling a huge
rock uphill and never reaching the top; the ungrateful mind, never
satisfied with life's simple pleasures, is no better off than the
maidens pouring water into riddled urns.

If there is a hell, it
18
is not hereafter, but prepared for the sinner in this life.

In the second place, the conscience of the sinner will never
19
be at rest but will torment him with remorse for his crimes.
We are naturally led to enquire what is the nature of this troublesome conscience.

Does it consist in the sad remembrance of having

failed in our obligation to abide by an objective order of right
and wrong?

Nowhere dOes Lucretius lead us to believe so.

In

fact, as Bailey pOints out, in Epicureanism there is no such thing
20
as real obligation.
Man need only be true to himself and to his

18 D. R. N., III, 984ff.
19 Ibia.,-III, 827.
20 Bailey, Greek Atomists

~

Epicurus, 486.
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own instinct for personal well-being.

Whence, then, the remorse?

It rises from the fear of punishment for crime, the fear of eventual discovery.
sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis
est insignibus insignis, scelerisque luella,
carcer et horribilis de saxo iactu' deorsum,
verbera carnifices robur pix lammina taedae;
quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis
praemetuens adhibet sttmulos terretque flagellis
nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum
possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis ••• 21
There is no assurance that the sinner will keep his crime
locked in his own mind.

Even if no one else discovers it, he him-

self may reveal it when off his guard, speaking in sleep or de22
lirium.
The poet is here following Epicurus exactly, for the
Master had said:
Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only
in consequence of the fear which attaches to
the apprehension of being unable to escape those
appointed to punish such actions. It is not
possible for one who acts in secret contravention ••• to be confident that he will escape detection, even if at present he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape. 23
We see, then, that the strongest motive for a good life is
no more than the fear of enslavement to one's desires, and the

21
22
23

D. R. N., III, l014ff.
Ibid.,-V, l156ff.
Eplcurus, "Fundamental Doctrines", in Epicuru8, translation
and commentary by C. Bailey, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926,

##34, 35.
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fear of discovery and punishment.

Tranquility of mind is incom-

patible with such fear, so the wise man will avoid it by leading
a good life.

Beyond this there is no sanction.

What are we to say in criticism of this ethical apex of the
Lucretian system?

Our judgment will rest only on ethical and

theological grounds, since the poet's psychological argument
against divine sanction, based on the mortality of the material
soul, is subject in itself for another thesis.
In the first place, the Lucretian denial of divine sanction
falls apart with the rejection of his doctrines on the nature of
the gods and on divine causality and providence in the world.
As we have seen, his belief that the world came into being by
chance is thoroughly inadequate, since it violates the fundamental
prinCiple of causality.

If God is Creator of the world, it fol-

lows that .tie is its Lord, Master and Legislator.

When the natural

law he promulgated is violated, then account must be rendered to
Him.

He would be truly an unwise Law-giver if He did not intend

a punishment that would motivate man's observance of His law.
It is unfortunate, but understandable in the light of his

I'

i!

times, that Lucretius did not see the possibility of divine Love
behind the notion of divine Justice.

If God decreed, in the very

establishment of the natural law, punishment for the Sinner, it
was not with the primary intention of damning men, but that men
might earn the reward of union with Him in everlasting bliss.

The
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reward of heaven is what God wishes to bestow on his creatures if
they will only take it.

Hell is man's choice, not His.

Lucretius

was blinding himself to the ancient conviction of mankind when he
dodged the thought of divine reward for the virtuous life.

If his

theory did away with the fear of punishment, it also frustrated
the instinctive hopes of man for complete happiness.
In this regard, it is interesting to see how close the poet

inadvertently came to the discovery that man's finis in life is
beatitude, the state after death when intellect and will, capable
of knowing and loving perfect Goodness, will be completely satisfied.

In one of Lucretius' most stirring passages, he upraids

the dissatisfied man in the voice of nature.
nam si grata fuit tibi vita anteacta priorque
et non omnia pertusum congesta quasi in vas
commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere:
cur non ut· plenus vitae conviva recedis
aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem?24
Again, in a later passage of the same book, Lucretius marvels at
the lust for life that characterizes all men, and reveals itself
in their longing for ever new pleasures.
praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque
nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas;
sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur
cetera; post aliut, cum contigit illud, avemus
et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. 2 5

24
25

D. R. N., III, 935ff.
Ibid.,-III, l080ff.
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From these two passages we see that the poet was well aware that
no temporal pleasure can really satisfy man.

Others who have dis-

covered this natural 'thirst in man for perfect beatitude have
found in it the basis of a psychological
life.

~rgument

for an after-

Lucretius did not take this further step, but turned back

and chose to berate man for his multiple desires and constant
dissatisfaction, failing to see that by doing so he was opposing
the very call of nature itself.

It is as though he felt that the

only way to satisfy man's longing for beatitude was to cruwh the
longing itself in as many outlets as possible.

By limiting de-

sires, man could limit the pain of dissatisfaction.

This was the

weird and surprising conclusion of a system that made temporal
pleasure the end and norm of life.

How much truer to man's nature

is the doctrine of an absolutely perfect beatitude in another
life, where man's capacity for joy will be completely filled.
Certainly Epicureanism did not give "new courage to meet
26
death".
Men longed for heaven as much as they feared hell.

It

was not death so much as dy-ing that they dreaded - the loss of
their hold on life and being.
self-preservation.

This is mants instinctive sense of

To try to console him with the thought that

life ends at the grave was, as Sikes points out, very weak
27
chology.

26
27

Hadzits, Lucretius-!B& His Influence, 135.
Sikes, 132.
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Our second criticism or the Lucretian idea of sanction is to
note how inadequate his proposals were to motivate men, especially
his

OVID

countrymen, to lead good lives.

We have seen that Epi-

curus, and Lucretius arter him, proposed a rairly high standard
of conduct to their followers.

'Pleasure' was not to be inter-

preted as the intemperate indulgence of lower appetites.
know that the Epicureans
the Founder's time on.

~

Yet, we

charged with this very abuse rrom

Horace could speak or himselr humorously

but signiricantly, as having been a "pig rrom the sty or Epicurus",
and one or the outstanding proponents of Epicureanism in the same
28
period was noted for his dissolute lire.
There must have been
a reason for this contrast between the system's theory or life and
its actual erfectiveness as seen in the lives ·or so many or its
rollowers.
Masson conrirms our suspicions and puts his ringer on the
sore spot.
Epicurus did not surriciently allow ror the
ract that pleasure ror himselr was one thing,
and ror the average man an entirely dirrerent
thing. The consequence is what we might expect. So long as Epicurus survived, going in
and out among his disciples, his own noble lire
and practice ensured that his doctrines should
not be gravely misconstrued; so soon as he was
dead, and his doctrines stood alone, they were
only too certain to be perverted and made to
justiry selr-indulgence and erreminacy.29

28
, 29

Cicero, "In Pisonem", in Me Tullii Ciceronis Orationes,Vol.4,
with commentary by G.Long~ Whittaker, London,l858, xxviii, 69.
Masson, 362.
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The simple fact is that the summum bonum of pleasure was open
to easy abuse, particularly in Lucretius' surroundings.

The old

ideal of stern Roman virtue had broken down before luxury, excess
and despotism.

Perhaps the young poets, Catullus and the elegists

especially, are not perfectly representative of their period, but
they certainly must reflect an alarming increase in loose living.
Extreme license, intrigue and temporary liaisons seem to have become the main preoccupation of the leisurely class.

This was

certainly no time to introduce such an individualistic philosophy
of life as Lucretius had to offer.

What the Romans needed was

something to brace them, a tonic rather than a sedative that could
only drug the moral sensibilities already sadly deteriorating.
The Lucretian remedy failed completely because it drew no
clear line between right and wrong, but depended on subjective
prudence to determine the difference.
After all, then, Lucretius is reduced to ordinary
moral suasion, and finds no new power or sanction that could keep erring human nature in the
right path. And we must sadly allow that no
real moral end is enunciated by him; his ideal
seems to be quietism in this life, end annihilation afterwards. 30
Nowhere is this deficiency so marked as in the Epicurean atI

titude toward the social virtue of justice.

This virtue was not

the natural effect of man's ability and desire to live in company

~

II

I

30

Fowler, Social Life at

~,

330.
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with his fellow men, as it had been in the philosophy of Plato and
Aristotle.

In Epicureanism the individual could aim only at the

maximum of personal pleasure, without consideration of his neighbor.

The only reason he respected the 'rights' of others was be-

cause he feared violation of his own.

"The laws exist for the

sake of the wise, not that they may not do wrong, but that they
31
may not suffer it".
Justice has no intrinsic value, but is
merely an insurance measure.
The ideal from the individual's point of view
is really injustice; if only he could commit
injustice consistently without ever being discovered, that would be best, but unfortunately
not only is there the danger of detection, but
what is still worse, because it is a permanent
disturbance of mental peace, there 1s always
the dread of detection.32
Epicurus was at least honest enough to answer his own question:

~ill

the wise man do things that the laws forbid if he

knows that he will not be detected?", with the unsatisfactory re33
mark: "a Simple answer is not easy to find".
It is easy to see
how such a pliant and uncertain moral standard could be used as a
handle for unscrupulous living, according to individual tastes and
inclinations.

A person of strong passions would not be likely to

philosophize about the ill-effects his excesses might have on the

31
32
33

Epicurus, "Fragments", in Bailey's Epicurus, LXXXI.
Bailey, Greek Atomists and E1icurus, 512.
Epicurus, *Fragments", rn-Ba ley's Epicurus, II.
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tranquil harmony of the whole man.

And certainly many a sinner

would be willing to run the risk of having his secret transgressions revealed if that were the only sanction he need fear.

We

must really marvel at the amazing ignorance of human nature manifested by both Epicurus and Lucretius.

We have no reason to doubt

their own sincere oonviction of the value of the system.

How they
\

failed to see what form it would take in minds less philosophioally inclined is a mystery.

Their idealistic world had little in

oommon with the practioal world of every-day life.
There remains one last and telling criticism of the Epicurean
sanction proposed by Lucretius: it made no provision for the

world~

unfortunate; for the poor; for the suffering who crowded Rome's
tenements; for the slaves who passed their lives so often in utter
degradation.

What solace could Lucretius offer them in this life

when hope for a better state of affairs in the next was taken from
them?

Perhaps Epicurus could exclaim that the "wise man was happy

even on the rack", but what logic is there in that when there is
no promise of a prospective reward to alleviate the misery?

There

was small comfort, indeed, in the thought that death, at least,
would end it all - the Master's last resort when faced with suffering that left no other consolation.
that his doctrine was a harsh one.

Lucretius could well fear

For the vast majority of his

fellow-men it stripped life of all rhyme and reason.

CONCLUSION
The denial of divine sanction was the last link in the
ethico-theological chain forged"by Lucretius.

It would be well,

in summary, to see how the poet's solution met the various threats
of superstition as they manifested themselves in the Rome of his
d~.

As we have seen, religious scruple and a sense of sin were
most prevalent during that critical first century before Christ.
The result was a widespread reception of oriental religions as the
confused and uncertain populace sought a catharsis for their
anxious fears.

Ecstatic orgies, characterized by brutal rites of

expiation, were becoming increasingly and dangerously common.
cretius destroyed all this with one stroke.

Lu-

In his system there

was no need to worry about the wrath of the gods.

The crisis

through which Rome was passing and which many interpreted as a
sign Of divine desertion, was not the dOing of the gods, but of
men.

The divine attributes of perfect happiness and rest pre-

vented the gods from interfering, malevolently or otherwise, in
the affairs of men.

Consequently, it was pure insanity for people

to debase themselves with fruitless propitiatory rites which could
only increase the worry and sorrow of the participants.
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Far
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better was it for men to compose their minds in tranquility, raising themselves above the political and social upheaval that surrounded them, and adjusting themselves, by inner peace, to the
storm without.
Orthodox prayer, for the same reason as rites of expiation,
was both useless and harmful.

Nothing could be more senseless

than to trouble the heedless ears of the gods with frenzied petitions for favors.

They were unconcerned with the petty troubles

of man, since they stood to gain nothing by helping him.

If they

could so much as desire to lend aid, they would be subject to
pain, and "that Was out of the question in beings of perfect happiness.
A second threat of superstition, as Lucretius saw it, was the
vague and anxious fears of the after-life.

His denial of divine

sanction destroyed those fears at their roots.

This life was all

that men could expect; if they were wise they would make the best
of it by refusing to allow any childish anxiety to rob them of
the peace of mind so essential for real beatitude.
Lastly, the Lucretian denial of divine providence reduced
augury and divination to a cheap device of a corrupt priesthood
which stood to profit by the enslavement of the people to such
superstitious practices.

It was silly to try to foretell divine

decrees when the gods were known to have no regard or care for
men.

Why not break the shackles once and for all, and enjoy peace
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of soul in the realization that man is the shaper of his own destiny without any fickle interference of divine beings.
The solution which Lucretius proposed introduced a radically
new relationship between the gods and men.

The best adjective we

can choose to describe that relationship is the word -negative".
It was characterized by independence; the individual was supreme,
and could assert himself boldly without fear of disrespect or foreboding of divine displeasure.

In other words, Lucretius eliminated

the traditional awe and humble reverence with which man hed always
looked upon the gods, and substituted a purely intellectual appreciation - one might say a professional esteem - for the divine
perfections.

The essential difference between God and man was

lost, as we find man regarding deity in much the same way as an
inferior artist would look upon a superior associate.

In general,

then, the chasm between human and divine was narrowed; man was
sublimated while God, no matter what Lucretius would say to the
contrary, Was debased.

The poet claimed to give the gods a posi-

tion worthy of their noble nature.

In reality he deprived them of

all that essentially elevated them above man.

Anthropomorphism

found its extreme expression in the theology of Lucretius.
Whatever the poet's intention may have been, there can be no
doubt that he swept away the foundations of religion.
recognized the fact and stated it conCisely.
tentiae omnium

~

Cicero

"Rorum enim sen-

modo superstitionem tollunt, in gua inest timor
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inanis ••• ~ etiam religionem quae deorum cultu pio continetur".l
Lucretius would have objected, of course, and claimed that a singular piety was encouraged in his system.

Did he not expressly

say that man should purify his mind so that it would be free to
contemplate the gods in tranquility?

But what Cicero saw and Lu-

cretius did not seem to see, was that, however noble such contemplation might appear in theory, in practice its significance would
be lost on the multitude.

The ordinary, practical-minded Roman

citizen would find the philosophical subtleties, by which esteem
for the gods Was preserved, too refined to mean much in his busy
life.

In this sense, Epicureanism was pitched too high for him.

In another sense, it was pitched too low.

The average man found

no real motive for a good life; the doctrine of religious quietism,
combined with the supreme end of tpleasure', waS bound to constitute a cloak for self-gratification at the expense of morality.
The doctrines offered by Lucretius favored and flattered the sensual tendencies in man, and to this fact the system owed its popularity in decadent Rome.

The poet would have deplored this mis-

carriage of his intentions, but so long as man had the essential
note of tanimality', the results could not be otherwise.
Lucretius was inspired by a noble motive when he set out to
destroy the bogy that WaS superstition.

Undoubtedly it was making

life miserable tor many of his countrymen.

1

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I, xlii, 117.

For this intention and
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for his courage in carrying it out, he is worthy of praise.

The

regrettable feature of his crusade was his unfortunate choice of
a solution; his unwarranted swing to the opposite extreme, which
could not heal, but only destroy.

He reminds us of nothing so

much as the zealous doctor who longs to cure, but all unknowingly
prescribes a deadly poison.

Rome's soul was close to perishing

when Lucretius came on the scene.
swift and certain death.

He left it in possession of

84

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Souroes
Cioero, M.T., De Divinatione, transl. by W.A. Falconer, London,
Heinemann; New York, Putnam's Sons, 1923.
------------, De Natura Deorum, transl. by H. Raokham, London,
Heinemann; New York, Putnam's Sons, 1933.
------------, Tusculan Dis~utations, transl. by J.E. King, London,
Heinemann; New York, utnam's Sons, 1927.
Diogenes Laertius, "Epicurus", transl. by R.D. Hioks, London,
Heinemann; New York, Putnam's Sons, 1925, in 2nd of 2 vols.
Epicurus, transl. by C. Bailey, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926.
Luoretius,' De Rerum Natura, transl. by W.H.D. Rouse, London,
Heinemann; New York, Putnam's Sons, 1924.
Secondary Sources
Bailey, C., The Greek Atomists
Press, 1928.

~

Epicurus, Oxford, Clarendon

----------, naeligion and Philosophy", The Legaoy of
C. Bailey, Oxford, Clarendon Press,-r923.

~,

ed. by

Duff, J.W., A Literary History of Rome (from the origins to the
close of the Golden Age), New York, Scribner's Sons, 1932.
Farnell, L.R., The Cults of the Greek States, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1896-1909, 5 VOla:Fowler, W.W., Social Life

~

Rome, New York, Maomillan, 1922.

------------, The Religious Experienoe 2f the Roman People, london, MacmTIIan, 1922.
Frank, T., Life and Literature in the Roman Republic, Berkeley,
Californla,-universlty of calif. Press, 1930.

85
Hadzits, G.D., "Lucretian Theory of Providence", The Classical
Weekly, IX, #19 (March, 1916), l46ff.
---------------, Lucretius and His Influence, New York Lon gmans,
Green & Co., 1935. --- --,
-------------, "The Lucretian Invocation of Venus", Classical
Philology, II, #2(APril, 1907), l87ff.
Hicks, R.D., Stoic

~

Epicurean, New York, Scribner, 1910.

Holmes, T.R., ~ Roman Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923,
1st of 3 vols.
Masson, J.J Lucretius, Eficurean and
1907 \2nd vol. 1909 •

~,

New York, E.P. Dutton,

Sellar, W.Y., The Roman Poets of the Republic, 3rd edit., London,
Oxford UnIV7 Press, 1932.----Sikes, E.E., Lucretius, Poet and Philosopher, Cambridge, University Press, 1936. ------Ueberveg, F., History of Philosophy, transl. by G.S. Morris, New
York, Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1877, 2 vols.
Wallace, W., Epicureanism, London, Society for Promoting Christian
Knowledge, 1880.
Zeller, E., Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, transl. by O.J.
Reichel, LOndon and New York, LOngmans, Green & Co., 1892.
Supplementary Bibliography
Donat, J., Ethica Generalis, Oeniponte (Innsbruck), Rauch, 1920.
Remer, V., Theologia Naturalis, 7th edition, edited by P.
Romae, Aedes UniversItatIs Gregorianae, 1931.

Geny,S.~,

